Riddles of Philosophy
GA 18
Preface to the 1923 Edition
[ 1 ] When, on the occasion of its second edition in 1914, I enlarged my book, World and Life Conceptions of the Nineteenth Century, the result was the present volume, The Riddles of Philosophy. In this book I intend to show those elements of world conceptions that appear historically and that move the contemporary observer of these riddles to experiences of greater depth of consciousness as he encounters the feelings with which they were experienced by the thinkers of the past. Such a deepening of the feelings is of profound satisfaction to one who is engaged in a philosophical struggle. What he in his own mind is striving for is strengthened through the fact that he sees how this endeavor took shape in earlier thinkers on whom life bestowed viewpoints that may be close to, or far from, his own. In this way I intend in this book to serve those who need a presentation of the development of philosophy as a supplement to their own paths of thought. [ 2 ] Such a supplement will be valuable to anyone who, in his own mode of thinking, wishes to feel himself at one with the intellectual work of mankind, and who would like to see that the work of his own thoughts has its roots in a universal need of the human soul. He can grasp this when he allows the essential elements of the historical world conceptions to unfold before his eye.
[ 3 ] For many observers, however, such a display has a depressive effect. It causes doubt to invade their minds. They see thinkers of the past contradicting their predecessors and contradicted by their successors in turn. It is the intention in my account of this process to show how this depressing aspect is extinguished by another element. Let us consider two thinkers. At first glance the contradiction of their thoughts strikes us as painful. We now take these thoughts under a closer inspection. We find that both thinkers direct their attention to entirely different realms of the world. Suppose one thinker had developed in himself the frame of mind that concentrates on the mode in which thoughts unfold in the inner weaving of the soul. For him it becomes a riddle how these inward soul processes can become decisive in a cognition concerning the nature of the external world. This point of departure will lend a special color to all his thinking. He will speak in a vigorous manner of the creative activity of the life of thought. Thus, everything he says will be colored by idealism. A second thinker turns his attention toward the processes accessible to external sense perception. The thought processes through which he holds these external events in cognitive perception do not themselves in their specific energy enter the field of his awareness. He will give a turn to the riddles of the universe that will place them in a thought environment in which the ground of the world itself will appear in a form that bears semblance to the world of the senses.
[ 4 ] If one approaches the historical genesis of the conflicting world views with presuppositions that result from such a thought orientation, one can overcome the deadening effect these world perspectives have on each other and raise the point of view to a level from which they appear in mutual support.
[ 5 ] Hegel and Haeckel, considered side by side, will at first sight present the most perfect contradiction. Penetrating into Hegel's philosophy, one can go along with him on the path to which a man who lives entirely in thoughts is bound. He feels the thought element as something that enables him to comprehend his own being as real. Confronted with nature, the question arises in him of the relation in which it stands toward the world of thought. It will be possible to follow his turn of mind if one can feel what is relatively justified and fruitful in such a mental disposition. If one can enter into Haeckel's thoughts, one can again follow him part of the way. Haeckel can only see what the senses grasp and how it changes. What is and changes in this way he can acknowledge as his reality, and he is only satisfied when he is able to comprise the entire human being, including his thought activity, under this concept of being and transformation. Now let Haeckel look on Hegel as a person who spins airy meaningless concepts without regard to reality. Grant that Hegel, could he have lived to know Haeckel, would have seen in him a person who was completely blind to true reality. Thus, whoever is able to enter into both modes of thinking will find in Hegel's philosophy the possibility to strengthen his power of spontaneous, active thinking. In Haeckel's mode of thought he will find the possibility to become aware of relations between distant formations of nature that tend to raise significant questions in the mind of man. Placed side by side and measured against one another in this fashion, Hegel and Haeckel will no longer lead us into oppressive skepticism but will enable us to recognize how the striving shoots and sprouts of life are sent out from very different corners of the universe.
[ 6 ] Such are the grounds in which the method of my presentation has its roots. I do not mean to conceal the contradictions in the history of philosophy, but I intend to show what remains valid in spite of the contradictions.
[ 7 ] That Hegel and Haeckel are treated in this book to reveal what is positive and not negative in both of them can, in my opinion, be criticized as erroneous only by somebody who is incapable of seeing how fruitful such a treatment of the positive is.
[ 8 ] Let me add just a few more words about something that does not refer to the content of the book but is nevertheless connected with it. This book belongs to those of my works referred to by persons who claim to find contradictions in the course of my philosophical development. In spite of the fact that I know such reproaches are mostly not motivated by a will to search for truth, I will nevertheless answer them briefly.
Such critics maintain that the chapter on Haeckel gives the impression of having been written by an orthodox follower of Haeckel. Whoever reads in the same book what is said about Hegel will find it difficult to uphold this statement. Superficially considered, it might, however, seem as if a person who wrote about Haeckel as I did in this book had gone through a complete transformation of spirit when he later published books like Knowledge of the Higher World and Its Attainment, An Outline of Occult Science, etc.
[ 9 ] But the question is only seen in the right light if one remembers that my later works, which seem to contradict my earlier ones, are based on a spiritual intuitive insight into the spiritual world. Whoever intends to acquire or preserve for himself an intuition of this kind must develop the ability to suppress his own sympathies and antipathies and to surrender with perfect objectivity to the subject of his contemplation. He must really, in presenting Haeckel's mode of thinking, be capable of being completely absorbed by it. It is precisely from this power to surrender to the object that he derives spiritual intuition. My method of presentation of the various world conceptions has its origin in my orientation toward a spiritual intuition. It would not be necessary to have actually entered into the materialistic mode of thinking merely to theorize about the spirit. For that purpose it is sufficient simply to show all justifiable reasons against materialism and to present this mode of thought by revealing its unjustified aspects. But to effect spiritual intuition one cannot proceed in this manner. One must be capable of thinking idealistically with the idealist and materialistically with the materialist. For only thus will the faculty of the soul be awakened that can become active in spiritual' intuition.
[ 10 ] Against this, the objections might be raised that in such a treatment the content of the book would lose its unity. I am not of that opinion. An historical account will become the more faithful the more the phenomena are allowed to speak for themselves. It cannot be the task of an historical presentation to fight materialism or to distort it into a caricature, for within its limits it is justified. It is right to represent materialistically those processes of the world that have a material cause. We only go astray when we do not arrive at the insight that comes when, in pursuing the material processes, we are finally led to the conception of the spirit. To maintain that the brain is not a necessary condition of our thinking insofar as it is related to sense perception is an error. It is also an error to assume that the spirit is not the creator of the brain through which it reveals itself in the physical world through the production and formation of thought.
Vorrede zur Neuauflage 1923
[ 1 ] Als ich 1914 mein Buch «Welt- und Lebensanschauungen im neunzehnten Jahrhundert» beim Erscheinen der zweiten Auflage zu dem hier vorliegenden erweiterte, wollte ich zeigen, was von den geschichtlich aufgetretenen Weltanschauungen sich für den heutigen Beobachter so darstellt, daß dessen eigenes Empfinden beim Auftauchen der philosophischen Rätsel im Bewußtsein sich vertiefen kann an dem Empfinden, das die in der Zeitenfolge auftauchenden Denker über diese Rätsel gehabt haben. Eine solche Vertiefung hat für den philosophisch Ringenden etwas Befriedigendes. Was seine eigene Seele erstrebt, gewinnt an Kraft dadurch, daß er sieht, wie sich in Menschen, denen das Leben Gesichtspunkte angewiesen hat, die dem seinigen nahe oder fern liegen, dieses Streben gestaltet hat. In solcher Art wollte ich mit dem Buche denen dienen, die eine Darstellung des Werdens der Philosophie brauchen als Ergänzung der eigenen Gedankenwege.
[ 2 ] Nach einer solchen Ergänzung wird derjenige verlangen, der sich auf dem eigenen Gedankenwege eins fühlen möchte mit der Geistesarbeit der Menschheit. Der sehen möchte, daß seine Gedankenarbeit ihre Wurzel in einem ganz allgemeinen menschlichen Seelenbedürfnis hat. Er kann das sehen, wenn das Wesentliche der geschichtlichen Weltanschauungen vor seinem Blicke aufsteigt.
[ 3 ] Doch hat für viele Betrachter ein solches Aufsteigen etwas Beklemmendes. Es drängt ihnen Zweifel in die Seele. Sie sehen, wie die aufeinander folgenden Denker im Widerspruche mit vorangehenden oder nachfolgenden stehen. Ich wollte so darstellen, daß dieses Beklemmende durch ein anderes ausgelöscht wird. Man betrachtet zwei Denker. Für den ersten Blick fällt der Widerspruch, in dem sie stehen, peinlich auf. Man tritt ihren Gedanken näher. Man findet, daß der eine die Aufmerksamkeit auf ein ganz anderes Gebiet der Welt lenkt als der andere. Angenommen, der eine habe in sich die Seelenstimmung ausgebildet, die die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Art lenkt, wie Gedanken im inneren Weben der Seele sich entfalten. Für ihn wird es zum Rätsel, daß dieses innere Seelengeschehen im Erkennen entscheidend über das Wesen der Außenwelt werden soll. Dieser Ausgangspunkt gibt seinem ganzen Denken die Färbung. Er wird in kraftvoller Art von dem schöpferischen Gedankenwesen sprechen. Das wird alles, was er sagt, in idealistischer Art färben. Ein anderer lenkt den Blick auf das äußere sinnenfällige Geschehen. Die Gedanken, durch die er dieses Geschehen erkennend erfaßt, treten gar nicht in ihrer selbständigen Kraft in sein Bewußtsein. Er wird den Weltenrätseln eine Wendung geben, die sie in den Bereich führt, in dem die Weltgrundlage selbst ein an die Sinneswelt erinnerndes Aussehen hat.
[ 4 ] Man kann, wenn man mit Voraussetzungen an das geschichtliche Werden der Weltanschauungen herangeht, die sich aus einer solchen Gedankenorientierung ergeben, über das Vernichtende, das diese Weltanschauungen füreinander zeigen, sich erheben und ein sich gegenseitig Tragendes in ihnen erblicken.
[ 5 ] Hegel und Haeckel, nebeneinander betrachtet, stellen zunächst den vollkommensten Widerspruch dar. Vertieft man sich in Hegel, so kann man mit ihm den Weg gehen, der einem ganz in Gedanken lebenden Menschen vorgezeichnet ist. Er fühlt den Gedanken wie etwas, das ihm das eigene Wesen zu einem wirklichen macht. Sieht er sich der Natur gegenüber, so frägt er sich, welches Verhältnis hat sie zur Gedankenwelt? Man wird mitgehen können, wenn man das relativ Berechtigte und Fruchtbare einer solchen Seelenstimmung empfindet. Vertieft man sich in Haeckel, so kann man wieder ein Stück des Weges mit ihm gehen. Er kann nur sehen, wie das Sinnenfällige ist und sich wandelt. In diesem Sein und Sich-Wandeln fühlt er, was ihm Wirklichkeit sein kann. Er ist nur befriedigt, wenn er den ganzen Menschen bis herauf zur Denktätigkeit in dieses Sein und Sich-Wandeln einreihen kann. Mag nun Haeckel in Hegel einen Menschen sehen, der luftig-wesenlose Begriffe ohne Rücksicht auf die Wirklichkeit spinnt; möchte Hegel, wenn er Haeckel erlebt hätte, in ihm eine Persönlichkeit gesehen haben, die gegenüber dem wahren Sein mit Blindheit geschlagen ist: wer sich in bei der Denkungsart vertiefen kann, wird bei Hegel die Möglichkeit finden, die Kraft des eigentätigen Denkens zu stärken, bei Haeckel die andere, zwischen entfernten Bildungen der Natur Beziehungen gewahrzuwerden, die bedeutungsvolle Fragen an das menschliche Denken stellen. So nebeneinander gestellt können Hegel und Haeckel, nicht aneinander gemessen, nicht in beklemmende Zweifel führen, sondern erkennen lassen, aus wie verschiedenen Ecken her das Leben sprießt und sproßt.
[ 6 ] Aus solchen Untergründen heraus ist die Haltung meiner Darstellung geworden. Ich wollte die Widersprüche in der Entwickelungsgeschichte der Weltanschauungen nicht verdunkeln; aber ich wollte auch in dem Widersprechenden das Geltende aufzeigen.
[ 7 ] Daß ich Hegel und Haeckel in diesem Buche so behandle, daß bei beiden das hervortritt, was positiv und nicht negativ wirkt, kann mir nach meiner Ansicht nur derjenige als eine Verirrung vorwerfen, der die Fruchtbarkeit einer solchen Behandlung des Positiven nicht einzusehen vermag.
[ 8 ] Nun nur noch einige Worte über etwas, das sich zwar nicht auf das in dem Buche Dargestellte bezieht, das aber doch mit ihm zusammenhängt. Es ist dies Buch eine derjenigen meiner Arbeiten, die von Persönlichkeiten, welche in dem Fortgang meiner eigenen Weltanschauungsentwickelung Widersprüche finden wollen, als Beispiel angeführt wird. Obwohl ich weiß, daß diesen Vorwürfen zumeist etwas ganz anderes zugrunde liegt als das Suchen nach Wahrheit, so will ich doch weniges über sie sagen. Es wird behauptet, es sehe das Kapitel über Haeckel in diesem Buche so aus, als ob es ein orthodoxer Haeckelianer geschrieben hätte. Nun, wer das in demselben Buche über Hegel Gesagte liest, wird es zwar schwer haben, seine Behauptung aufrechtzuhalten. Aber es sieht, obenhin betrachtet, so aus, als ob ein Mensch, der so über Haeckel geschrieben hat wie ich in diesem Buche, später eine völlige Geisteswandlung durchgemacht haben müßte, wenn er dann Bücher veröffentlicht wie «Wie erlangt man Erkenntnisse der höheren Welten», «Geheimwissenschaft» usw.
[ 9] Diese Sache wird aber nur richtig angesehen, wenn man bedenkt, daß die scheinbar den früheren widersprechenden späteren Werke aus einer geistigen Anschauung der geistigen Welt hervorgegangen sind. Wer eine solche Anschauung haben oder sich bewahren will, der muß die Fähigkeit entwickeln, sich in alles Betrachtete ganz objektiv, mit Unterdrückung der eigenen Sympathien und Antipathien, versetzen zu können. Er muß wirklich, wenn er die HaeckeIsche Denkungsart darstellt, in dieser aufgehen können. Gerade aus diesem Aufgehen in anderes schöpft er die Fähigkeit der geistigen Anschauung. Die Art meiner Darstellung der einzelnen Weltanschauungen hat ihre Ursachen in meiner Orientierung nach einer geistigen Anschauung hin. Wer über den Geist nur theoretisieren will, der braucht nie in die materialistische Denkungsart sich versetzt zu haben. Er kann sich damit begnügen, alle berechtigten Gründe gegen den Materialismus vorzubringen und seine Darstellung dieser Denkungsart so zu halten, daß diese ihre unberechtigten Seiten enthüllt. Wer geistige Anschauung betätigen will, kann das nicht. Er muß mit dem Idealisten idealistisch, mit dem Materialisten materialistisch denken können. Denn nur dadurch wird in ihm die Seelenfähigkeit rege, die sich in der geistigen Anschauung betätigen kann.
[ 10 ] Nun könnte man noch sagen: durch eine solche Behandlungsart verliere der Inhalt eines Buches seine Einheitlichkeit. Es ist dies nicht meine Ansicht. Man stellt historisch um so treuer dar, je mehr man die Erscheinungen selbst sprechen läßt. Den Materialismus bekämpfen oder zum Zerrbild machen, kann nicht die Aufgabe einer geschichtlichen Darstellung sein. Denn er hat seine eingeschränkte Berechtigung. Man ist nicht auf falscher Fährte, wenn man die materiell bedingten Vorgänge der Welt materialistisch darstellt; man gelangt erst dahin, wenn man nicht zur Einsicht gelangt, daß die Verfolgung der materiellen Zusammenhänge zuletzt zur Anschauung des Geistes führt. Behaupten, das Gehirn sei nicht Bedingung des auf Sinnenfälliges sich beziehen den Denkens, ist eine Verirrung; eine weitere Verirrung ist, daß der Geist nicht der Schöpfer des Gehirns sei, durch das er in der physischen Welt sich in Gedankenbildung offenbart.
Goetheanum in Dornach bei Basel
November 1923, Rudolf Steiner
Preface to the new edition in 1923
[ 1 ] When I expanded my book "Welt- und Lebensanschauungen im neunzehnten Jahrhundert" in 1914, when the second edition appeared, into the present one, I wanted to show what of the world views that have emerged historically presents itself to the contemporary observer in such a way that his own perception of the philosophical riddles that emerge in his consciousness can be deepened by the perception that the thinkers who emerged in the chronological sequence had of these riddles. Such a deepening has something satisfying for the philosophically struggling person. What his own soul strives for gains strength from the fact that he sees how this striving has taken shape in people to whom life has assigned points of view that are near or far from his own. In this way, I wanted this book to serve those who need an account of the development of philosophy as a supplement to their own paths of thought.
[ 2 ] Those who wish to feel at one with the spiritual work of humanity on their own path of thought will long for such a supplement. Who wants to see that his thought work has its root in a very general human soul need. He can see this when the essence of historical world views rises before his gaze.
[ 3 ] However, for many observers, such an ascent has something oppressive about it. It forces doubt into their souls. They see how the successive thinkers stand in contradiction to the preceding or following ones. I wanted to show how this oppressive aspect is erased by another. One looks at two thinkers. At first glance, the contradiction between them is embarrassingly obvious. One approaches their thoughts. One finds that the one directs attention to a completely different area of the world than the other. Suppose the one has developed in himself the mood of soul which directs attention to the way thoughts unfold in the inner weaving of the soul. For him it becomes a puzzle that this inner soul process should become decisive in his cognition of the nature of the outer world. This starting point colors his entire thinking. He will speak in a powerful way of the creative being of thought. This will color everything he says in an idealistic way. Another will direct his gaze to the external sensuous event. The thoughts through which he grasps these events in a recognizing way do not enter his consciousness in their independent power. He will give the riddles of the world a turn that leads them into the realm in which the basis of the world itself has an appearance reminiscent of the sensory world.
[ 4 ] If one approaches the historical development of worldviews with presuppositions that result from such an orientation of thought, one can rise above the destructive effect that these worldviews have on one another and see in them a mutual support.
[ 5 ] Hegel and Haeckel, considered side by side, initially represent the most perfect contradiction. If one immerses oneself in Hegel, one can follow with him the path that is marked out for a person living entirely in thought. He feels thought as something that makes his own being a real one. When he looks at nature, he asks himself, what is its relationship to the world of thought? One will be able to go along with him if one feels the relative justification and fruitfulness of such a mood of the soul. If you immerse yourself in Haeckel, you can go part of the way with him again. He can only see how the sensible is and how it changes. In this being and changing, he feels what can be reality for him. He is only satisfied when he can include the whole human being, right up to the activity of thinking, in this being and self-transformation. Haeckel may now see in Hegel a man who spins airy, insubstantial concepts without regard for reality; Hegel, if he had experienced Haeckel, may have seen in him a personality that is blind to true being: whoever can delve into the way of thinking will find in Hegel the possibility of strengthening the power of independent thinking, in Haeckel the other of becoming aware of relationships between distant formations of nature that pose meaningful questions to human thinking. Placed side by side in this way, Hegel and Haeckel, not measured against each other, do not lead to oppressive doubts, but allow us to recognize from how different corners life sprouts and sprouts.
[ 6 ] The attitude of my presentation has emerged from such backgrounds. I did not want to obscure the contradictions in the history of the development of world views; but I also wanted to show what is valid in what is contradictory.
[ 7 ] The fact that I treat Hegel and Haeckel in this book in such a way that both emphasize what is positive and not negative can, in my opinion, only be reproached as an aberration by those who are unable to see the fruitfulness of such a treatment of the positive.
[ 8 ] Now just a few words about something that does not relate to what is presented in the book, but which is nevertheless connected with it. This book is one of those of my works that is cited as an example by people who want to find contradictions in the development of my own world view. Although I know that these accusations are usually based on something quite different from the search for truth, I will say little about them. It is claimed that the chapter on Haeckel in this book looks as if it had been written by an orthodox Haeckelian. Well, anyone who reads what is said about Hegel in the same book will find it difficult to maintain his assertion. But it looks, from above, as if a person who has written about Haeckel as I have done in this book must later have undergone a complete change of mind, if he then publishes books such as "Wie erlangt man Erkenntnisse der höheren Welten", "Geheimwissenschaft" etc.
[ 9] However, this matter is only considered correct if one considers that the later works, which seem to contradict the earlier ones, have emerged from a spiritual view of the spiritual world. Whoever wishes to have or preserve such a view must develop the ability to be able to put himself in the position of everything he observes quite objectively, suppressing his own sympathies and antipathies. If he represents Haecke's way of thinking, he must really be able to merge into it. It is precisely from this absorption in something else that he draws the capacity for spiritual contemplation. The nature of my presentation of the individual world views has its causes in my orientation towards a spiritual view. He who only wants to theorize about the spirit need never have placed himself in the materialistic way of thinking. He can content himself with putting forward all the justified reasons against materialism and presenting this way of thinking in such a way that it reveals its unjustified aspects. He who wishes to exercise spiritual contemplation cannot do so. He must be able to think idealistically with the idealist and materialistically with the materialist. For it is only in this way that the faculty of the soul is aroused in him, which can be exercised in spiritual contemplation.
[ 10 ] Now one could still say that the content of a book loses its unity through this kind of treatment. This is not my view. The more one allows the phenomena themselves to speak, the more faithfully one presents history. Fighting materialism or turning it into a distorted image cannot be the task of historical representation. For it has its limited justification. One is not on the wrong track if one presents the materially conditioned processes of the world in a materialistic way; one only gets there if one does not come to the realization that the pursuit of material connections ultimately leads to the view of the spirit. To assert that the brain is not the condition of thought relating to the sensible is an aberration; a further aberration is that the spirit is not the creator of the brain, through which it reveals itself in the physical world in the formation of thought.
Goetheanum in Dornach near Basel
November 1923, Rudolf Steiner