Goethe's Conception of the World
GA 6
XI. Goethe and Hegel
[ 1 ] Goethe's study of the world covers a certain range only. He observes the phenomena of light and colour and penetrates to the basic phenomenon; he tries to find his bearings amid the multiplicity of plant life and arrives at his sensible-supersensible archetypal plant. He does not rise from the basic phenomena or the archetypal plant to higher explanatory principles. This he leaves to the philosophers. He is content when “he finds himself on an empirical height whence he can make a backward survey of all the stages of experience and look forward into the region of theory, even if he cannot enter it.” In his perception of the real, Goethe advances to the point where the ideas confront him. The way in which the ideas are mutually connected, how the one thing proceeds from another in the spheres of ideas—these are tasks which first begin on the empirical height where Goethe stopped. His view is that “the idea is eternal and unique.” “The fact that we also use the plural is unfortunate. All things of which we become aware and of which we can speak, are only manifestations of the idea.” But since the idea makes its appearance in the phenomenon as a multiplicity of single ideas, for instance, the idea of the plant, the idea of the animal, it must be possible to trace them back to one fundamental form, just as it is possible to trace the plant back to the leaf. The single ideas differ in their manifestation only; in their true being they are identical. It is therefore just as much in accordance with the Goethean world-conception to speak of a metamorphosis of ideas as of a metamorphosis of plants. Hegel is the philosopher who has tried to portray this metamorphosis of ideas. He is therefore the philosopher of the Goethean world-conception. He takes as his starting-point the simplest of all ideas, that of pure “Being.” In this “Being” the true form of world-phenomena conceals itself completely and its rich content becomes a bloodless abstraction. Hegel has been accused of deriving the entire rich world of idea from pure “Being.” But pure Being contains “as idea” the whole world of ideas just as the leaf contains the whole plant as idea. Hegel follows up the metamorphosis of the idea from pure abstract Being to the stage where the idea becomes direct, actual appearance. He considers this highest stage to be the phenomenon of philosophy itself. For in philosophy the ideas operative in the world are perceived in their essential form. Speaking in the Goethean sense, we could say: Philosophy is the idea in its greatest extension; pure Being is the idea in its utmost contraction. The fact that Hegel sees in philosophy the most perfect metamorphosis of the idea, proves that true self-perception is as alien to him as it is to Goethe. An object has reached its highest metamorphosis when it brings to expression in perception, in immediate life, its full content. Philosophy, however, does not contain the ideal content of the world in the form of life but in the form of thoughts. The living idea, the idea as perception, is given to human self-perception alone. Hegel's philosophy is not a world-conception of Freedom because it does not seek the world-content in its highest form on the basis of the human personality. On this basis all content becomes entirely individual. Hegel does not search for this individual element but for the general, the species. Hence he does not relegate the origin of the Moral to the sphere of human individuality, but to the World Order lying outside of man which is supposed to contain the moral ideas. Man does not himself set his own moral goal but he has to become a member of the moral World Order. Hegel looks upon the particular, the individual, as something bad when it persists in its individuality. It has its value only within the whole. Stirner considers this to be the mental attitude of the bourgeoisie, “and their poet Goethe, like their philosopher Hegel, have known how to extol the dependence of the subject on the object, obedience to the objective world and so on.” We have here yet another biased mode of conception. In Hegel, as well as in Goethe, the perception of freedom is lacking because the perception of the innermost essence of the world of thought eludes both of them. Hegel feels himself to be the philosopher of the Goethean world-conception. On February 20th, 1821, he writes to Goethe as follows: “The simple and abstract, which you very strikingly call the basic phenomenon, you place at the summit; then you show the concrete phenomena as arising out of the addition of further modes of influence and circumstances, and regulate the whole process in such a way that the order proceeds from the simple to the more complex conditions; and, thus ordered, the complex now appears in all its clearness as a result of this analysis. To discover the basic phenomenon, to free it from the surroundings accidental to it, to conceive it abstractly as we say—this I consider to be a matter pertaining to the great, spiritual perception of Nature, besides being the path in general towards the truly scientific side of knowledge in this field. ... May I, however, also say to you that the special interest which a basic phenomenon brought to life in such a way has for us philosophers, is that we are able to turn it to the use of philosophy. We have, of course, in the first place our oyster-like, grey, or quite black Absolute, nevertheless we have directed it towards the air and the light, so that it has become covetous of these, but we need window-spaces in order finally to bring it out to the full light of day; our schemes would disappear in smoke if we were to transplant them into the motley, intricate society of the perverse world. At this point, your basic phenomena serve us excellently; in this twilight, spiritual and intelligible by virtue of its simplicity, visible and tangible by virtue of its sensibility, the two worlds, our abstruse one and phenomenal existence, greet each other.”
[ 2 ] Even if there is a perfect correspondence between Goethe's world-conception and Hegel's philosophy, it would be a great mistake to place the same value upon Goethe's achievements in thought as upon those of Hegel. Their mode of conception is the same; both of them want to avoid self-perception. Goethe, however, put his reflections into operation in regions where the lack of perception does not have a harmful effect. Even if he has never seen the world of ideas as perception, he has lived in the world of ideas and has allowed his observations to be permeated thereby. The world of ideas was apprehended by Hegel as perception, as individual spiritual Being, just as little as by Goethe. What he did, however, was to reflect about the world of ideas, and as a result his thoughts in many directions are distorted and untrue. If Hegel had made observations about Nature they would have probably become just as valuable as those of Goethe; if Goethe had desired to build up a philosophical thought-structure, the sure perception of true reality that guided him in his observations of Nature would have forsaken him.
Goethe and Hegel
[ 1 ] Goethes Weltbetrachtung geht nur bis zu einer gewissen Grenze. Er beobachtet die Licht- und Farbenerscheinungen und dringt bis zum Urphänomen vor; er sucht sich innerhalb der Mannigfaltigkeit des Pflanzenwesens zurechtzufinden und gelangt zu seiner sinnlich-übersinnlichen Urpflanze. Von dem Urphänomen oder der Urpflanze steigt er nicht zu höheren Erklärungsprinzipien auf. Das überläßt er den Philosophen. Er ist befriedigt, wenn «er sich auf der empirischen Höhe befindet, wo er rückwärts die Erfahrung in allen ihren Stufen überschauen, und vorwärts in das Reich der Theorie, wo nicht eintreten, doch einblicken kann». Goethe geht in der Betrachtung des Wirklichen so weit, bis ihm die Ideen entgegenblicken. In welchem Zusammenhange die Ideen untereinander stehen; wie innerhalb des Ideellen das eine aus dem andern hervorgeht; das sind Aufgaben, die auf der empirischen Höhe erst beginnen, auf der Goethe stehen bleibt. «Die Idee ist ewig und einzig», meint er, « daß wir auch den Plural brauchen, ist nicht wohlgetan. Alles, was wir gewahr werden und wovon wir reden können, sind nur Manifestationen der Idee.» Da aber doch in der Erscheinung die Idee als eine Vielheit von Einzelideen auftritt, z. B. Idee der Pflanze, Idee des Tieres, so müssen diese sich auf eine Grundform zurückführen lassen, wie die Pflanze sich auf das Blatt zurückführen läßt. Auch die einzelnen Ideen sind nur in ihrer Erscheinung verschieden; in ihrem wahren Wesen sind sie identisch. Es ist also ebenso im Sinne der Goetheschen Weltanschauung, von einer Metamorphose der Ideen wie von einer Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu reden. Der Philosoph, der diese Metamorphose der Ideen darzustellen versucht hat, ist Hegel. Er ist dadurch der Philosoph der Goetheschen Weltanschauung. Von der einfachsten Idee, dem reinen «Sein» geht er aus. In diesem verbirgt sich die wahrhafte Gestalt der Welterscheinungen vollständig. Deren reicher Inhalt wird zum blutarmen Abstraktum. Man hat Hegel vorgeworfen, daß er aus dem reinen «Sein» die ganze inhaltvolle Welt der Ideen ableitet. Aber das reine Sein enthält «der Idee nach» die ganze Ideenwelt, wie das Blatt der Idee nach die ganze Pflanze enthält. Hegel verfolgt die Metamorphosen der Idee von dem reinen abstrakten Sein bis zu der Stufe, in der die Idee unmittelbar wirkliche Erscheinung wird. Er betrachtet als diese höchste Stufe die Erscheinung der Philosophie selbst. Denn in der Philosophie werden die in der Welt wirksamen Ideen in ihrer ureigenen Gestalt angeschaut. In Goethes Weise gesprochen könnte man etwa sagen: die Philosophie ist die Idee in ihrer größten Ausbreitung; das reine Sein ist die Idee in ihrer äußersten Zusammenziehung. Daß Hegel in der Philosophie die vollkommenste Metamorphose der Idee sieht, beweist, daß ihm die wahre Selbstbeachtung ebenso ferne liegt wie Goethe. Ein Ding hat seine höchste Metamorphose erreicht, wenn es in der Wahrnehmung, im unmittelbaren Leben seinen vollen Inhalt herausarbeitet. Die Philosophie aber enthält den Ideengehalt der Welt nicht in Form des Lebens, sondern in Form von Gedanken. Die lebendige Idee, die Idee als Wahrnehmung, ist allein der menschlichen Selbstbeobachtung gegeben. Hegels Philosophie ist keine Weltanschauung der Freiheit, weil sie den Weltinhalt in seiner höchsten Form nicht auf dem Grunde der menschlichen Persönlichkeit sucht. Auf diesem Grunde wird aller Inhalt ganz individuell. Nicht dieses Individuelle sucht Hegel, sondern das Allgemeine, die Gattung. Er verlegt den Ursprung des Sittlichen daher auch nicht in das menschliche Individuum, sondern in die außer dem Menschen liegende Weltordnung, welche die sittlichen Ideen enthalten soll. Der Mensch gibt sich nicht selbst sein sittliches Ziel, sondern er hat sich der sittlichen Weltordnung einzugliedern. Das Einzelne, Individuelle gilt Hegel geradezu als das Schlechte, wenn es in seiner Einzelheit verharrt. Erst innerhalb des Ganzen erhält es seinen Wert. Dies ist die Gesinnung der Bourgeoisie, meint Max Stirner «und ihr Dichter Goethe, wie ihr Philosoph Hegel haben die Abhängigkeit des Subjekts vom Objekte, den Gehorsam gegen die objektive Welt usw. zu verherrlichen gewußt». Damit ist wieder eine andere einseitige Vorstellungsart hingestellt. Hegel wie Goethe fehlt die Anschauung der Freiheit, weil beiden die Anschauung des innersten Wesens der Gedankenwelt abgeht. Hegel fühlt sich durchaus als Philosoph der Goetheschen Weltanschauung. Er schreibt am 20. Februar 1821 an Goethe: «Das Einfache und Abstrakte, was Sie sehr treffend das Urphänomen nennen, stellen Sie an die Spitze, zeigen dann die konkreteren Erscheinungen auf als entstehend durch das Hinzukommen weiterer Einwirkungsweisen und Umstände und regieren den ganzen Verlauf so, daß die Reihenfolge von den einfachen Bedingungen zu den zusammengesetztem fortschreitet und so rangiert, das Verwickelte nun durch diese Dekomposition in seiner Klarheit erscheint. Das Urphänomen auszuspüren, es von den andern, ihm selbst zufälligen Umgebungen zu befreien, - es abstrakt, wie wir dies heißen, aufzufassen, dies halte ich für eine Sache des großen geistigen Natursinns, sowie jenen Gang überhaupt für das wahrhaft Wissenschaftliche der Erkenntnis in diesem Felde.» «Darf ich Ew. usw. aber nun auch noch von dem besondern Interesse sprechen, welches ein so herausgehobenes Urphänomen für uns Philosophen hat, daß wir nämlich ein solches Präparat geradezu in den philosophischen Nutzen verwenden können! - Haben wir nämlich endlich unser zunächst austernhaftes, graues oder ganz schwarzes ... Absolutes doch gegen Luft und Licht hingearbeitet, daß es desselben begehrlich geworden, so brauchen wir Fensterstellen, um es vollends an das Licht des Tages herauszuführen; unsere Schemen würden zu Dunst verschweben, wenn wir sie so geradezu in die bunte verworrene Gesellschaft der widerhältigen Welt versetzen wollten. Hier kommen uns nun Ew. usw. Urphänomene vortrefflich zustatten; in diesem Zwielichte, geistig und begreiflich durch seine Einfachheit, sichtlich oder greiflich durch seine Sinnlichkeit - begrüßen sich die beiden Welten, unser Abstruses und das erscheinende Dasein, einander.»
[ 2 ] Wenn auch Goethes Weltanschauung und Hegels Philosophie einander vollkommen entsprechen, so würde man sich doch sehr irren, wenn man den Gedanken-Leistungen Goethes und denen Hegels den gleichen Wert zuerkennen wollte. In beiden lebt dieselbe Vorstellungsweise. Beide wollen die Selbstwahrnehmung vermeiden. Doch hat Goethe seine Reflexionen auf Gebieten angestellt, in denen der Mangel der Wahrnehmung nicht schädlich wirkt. Hat er auch nie die Ideenwelt als Wahrnehmung gesehen; er hat doch in der Ideenwelt gelebt und seine Beobachtungen von ihr durchdringen lassen. Hegel hat die Ideenwelt ebensowenig wie Goethe als Wahrnehmung, als individuelles Geist-Dasein geschaut. Er hat aber gerade über die Ideenwelt seine Reflexionen angestellt. Diese sind daher nach vielen Richtungen hin schief und unwahr. Hätte Hegel Beobachtungen über die Natur angestellt, so wären sie wohl ebenso wertvoll geworden wie diejenigen Goethes; hätte Goethe ein philosophisches Gedankengebäude aufstellen wollen, so hätte ihn wohl die sichere Anschauung der wahren Wirklichkeit verlassen, die ihn bei seinen Naturbetrachtungen geleitet hat.
Goethe and Hegel
[ 1 ] Goethe's view of the world only goes as far as a certain limit. He observes the phenomena of light and color and penetrates to the primordial phenomenon; he seeks to find his way within the diversity of the plant being and arrives at its sensual, supersensible primordial plant. He does not ascend from the primordial phenomenon or the primordial plant to higher principles of explanation. He leaves that to the philosophers. He is satisfied when "he finds himself on the empirical level, where he can look backwards over experience in all its stages, and forward into the realm of theory, if he cannot enter it, he can at least look into it. Goethe goes so far in his contemplation of the real that he can see the ideas. How the ideas are related to one another; how one emerges from the other within the ideal; these are tasks that only begin at the empirical level at which Goethe remains. "The idea is eternal and unique," he says, "that we also need the plural is not well done. Everything that we become aware of and of which we can speak are only manifestations of the idea." Since, however, the idea appears in manifestation as a multiplicity of individual ideas, e.g. the idea of the plant, the idea of the animal, these must be reducible to a basic form, just as the plant can be traced back to the leaf. The individual ideas are also only different in their appearance; in their true essence they are identical. It is therefore just as much in the spirit of Goethe's world view to speak of a metamorphosis of ideas as of a metamorphosis of plants. The philosopher who has attempted to describe this metamorphosis of ideas is Hegel. He is thus the philosopher of Goethe's world view. He starts from the simplest idea, pure "being". In this the true form of world phenomena is completely concealed. Their rich content becomes an anemic abstraction. Hegel has been reproached for deriving the whole world of ideas from pure "being". But pure being contains the whole world of ideas "according to the idea", just as the leaf contains the whole plant according to the idea. Hegel traces the metamorphoses of the idea from pure abstract being to the stage at which the idea becomes a directly real phenomenon. He considers this highest stage to be the appearance of philosophy itself. For in philosophy, the ideas that are effective in the world are seen in their very own form. In Goethe's terms, one could say: philosophy is the idea in its greatest expansion; pure being is the idea in its outermost contraction. The fact that Hegel sees in philosophy the most perfect metamorphosis of the idea proves that true self-regard is as far removed from him as it is from Goethe. A thing has reached its highest metamorphosis when it works out its full content in perception, in immediate life. Philosophy, however, contains the idea content of the world not in the form of life, but in the form of thought. The living idea, the idea as perception, is given solely to human self-observation. Hegel's philosophy is not a world view of freedom, because it does not seek the content of the world in its highest form on the ground of the human personality. On this ground all content becomes entirely individual. It is not this individual that Hegel seeks, but the general, the genus. He therefore does not place the origin of the moral in the human individual, but in the world order lying outside the human being, which is supposed to contain the moral ideas. Man does not give himself his moral goal, but has to integrate himself into the moral world order. For Hegel, the individual is considered to be the bad thing if it remains in its individuality. It only acquires its value within the whole. This is the attitude of the bourgeoisie, says Max Stirner, "and its poet Goethe, like its philosopher Hegel, knew how to glorify the dependence of the subject on the object, obedience to the objective world, etc.". This is again another one-sided mode of conception. Hegel, like Goethe, lacks the conception of freedom, because both lack the conception of the innermost essence of the world of thought. Hegel certainly feels himself to be a philosopher of Goethe's world view. He wrote to Goethe on February 20, 1821: "You place the simple and abstract, which you very aptly call the primal phenomenon, at the top, then point out the more concrete phenomena as arising through the addition of further modes of action and circumstances and govern the whole course in such a way that the sequence progresses from the simple conditions to the composite ones and ranks them in such a way that the complex now appears in its clarity through this decomposition. To trace out the original phenomenon, to free it from the other surroundings which are accidental to it, - to comprehend it abstractly, as we call it, this I regard as a matter of the great spiritual sense of nature, as well as that course in general as the truly scientific aspect of knowledge in this field." "But may I now also speak to you of the special interest that such an outstanding primordial phenomenon has for us philosophers, namely that we can use such a preparation for philosophical purposes! - For once we have finally exposed our initially oyster-like, gray or completely black ... ... absolute against air and light, so that it has become desirous of it, we need windows in order to bring it fully out into the light of day; our schemas would fade into a haze if we wanted to place them in the colorful, confused company of the disgusting world. Here now come to us Ew. etc. In this twilight, spiritual and comprehensible through its simplicity, visible or tangible through its sensuality - the two worlds, our abstruse and the appearing existence, greet each other."
[ 2 ] Although Goethe's worldview and Hegel's philosophy correspond perfectly, one would be very much mistaken if one were to attribute the same value to Goethe's and Hegel's intellectual achievements. The same mode of conception lives in both. Both want to avoid self-perception. Yet Goethe conducted his reflections in areas in which the lack of perception does not have a harmful effect. Even if he never saw the world of ideas as perception, he lived in the world of ideas and allowed it to permeate his observations. Like Goethe, Hegel did not see the world of ideas as perception, as individual spirit existence. But it was precisely on the world of ideas that he made his reflections. These are therefore skewed and untrue in many directions. If Hegel had made observations about nature, they would probably have been just as valuable as Goethe's; if Goethe had wanted to set up a philosophical edifice of thought, he would probably have lost the sure view of true reality that guided him in his observations of nature.