Goethe's Conception of the World
GA 6
Afterword to the New Edition (1918)
[ 1 ] It was said by critics of this book immediately after its publication that it does not give a picture of Goethe's “world-conception” but only of his “conception of Nature.” I do not think that this judgment has proceeded from a justifiable point of view, although, externally considered, the book is almost exclusively concerned with Goethe's ideas of Nature. In the course of what has been said, I think I have shown that these ideas of Nature are based upon a specific mode of observation of world phenomena. I think I have indicated in the book itself that the adoption of a point of view such as Goethe possessed in regard to natural phenomena can lead to definite views on psychological, historical and still wider phenomena. That which is expressed in Goethe's conception of Nature in a particular sphere, is indeed a world-conception and not a mere conception of Nature such as might well be possessed by a personality whose thoughts had no significance for a wider world-picture. On the other hand, moreover, I thought that in this book I ought only to present what may be said in immediate connection with the region that Goethe himself developed from out of the whole compass of his world-conception. To draw a picture of the world revealed in Goethe's poems, in his ideas on the history of Art, and so on, would of course be quite possible, and indubitably of the greatest interest. But those who take the character of the book into consideration will not look for such a world-picture therein. They will realise that I have set myself the task of sketching that portion of Goethe's world-picture for which the data exist in his own writings, the one proceeding consecutively from the others. I have indicated in many places the points at which Goethe came to a standstill in this consecutive development of the world-picture which he was able to present in regard to certain realms of Nature. Goethe's views of the world and of life reveal themselves in a very wide compass. The emergence of these views from out of his own original world-conception is not, however, so evident from his works in the sphere of natural phenomena as it is here. In other spheres, all that Goethe's soul had to reveal to the world becomes clear; in the domain of his ideas of Nature it becomes evident how the fundamental trend of his spirit won for itself, step by step, a view of the world up to a certain boundary. Precisely by going no further in the portrayal of Goethe's thought-activity than the elaboration of a self-contained fragment of world-conception, one will gain enlightenment as to the special colouring of what is revealed in the rest of his life's work. Therefore it was not my aim to portray the world-picture that emerges from Goethe's life-work as a whole, but rather that part of it which in his case comes to light in the form in which one brings a world-conception to expression in thought. It does not necessarily follow that views originating from a personality, however great, are parts of a world-view complete in itself and connected directly with the personality. Goethe's ideas of Nature are, however, such a self-contained fragment of a world-picture. And as an elucidation of natural phenomena they do not represent merely a view of Nature; they are an integral part of a world-conception.
[ 2 ] It does not surprise me that I should have been accused of a change of views since the publication of this book, for I am not unfamiliar with the presuppositions which lead one to such a judgment. I have spoken about this endeavour to find contradictions in my writings in the Preface to the first volume of my Riddles of Philosophy and in an essay in the journal Das Reich, Vol. II. (Spiritual Science as Anthroposophy and the contemporary Theory of Knowledge). Such an endeavour is only possible among critics who wholly fail to understand the course which my world-conception is bound to take when it wishes to consider different regions of life. I do not propose to enter into this question here again but to confine myself to certain brief remarks in reference to this book on Goethe. In the Anthroposophical Spiritual Science that I have presented in my writings for the past sixteen years, I myself see that mode of cognition for the spiritual world-content accessible to man, to which one must come who has brought to life within his soul Goethe's ideas of Nature as something with which he is in accord, and with this as his starting-point, strives to experience in cognition the spiritual region of the world. I am of opinion that this Spiritual Science presupposes a Natural Science corresponding to that of Goethe. I do not only mean that the Spiritual Science which I have presented does not contradict this Natural Science. For I know that the mere fact of there being no logical contradiction between two different statements means very little. They may none the less be wholly irreconcilable in reality. But I believe that Goethe's ideas in reference to the realm of Nature, when they are actually experienced, must necessarily lead to the Anthroposophical truths that I have set forth when man leads over his experiences in the realm of Nature to experiences in the realm of spirit. Goethe has not done this. The mode and nature of these latter experiences are described in my spiritual-scientific works. For this reason, the essential content of this book, which was published for the first time in 1897, has been reprinted again to-day, as my exposition of the Goethean world-conception, after the publication of my writings on Spiritual Science. All the thoughts presented here hold good for me to-day in unchanged form. In isolated places only have I introduced slight alterations and they have nothing to do with the form of the thoughts but merely with the wording of certain passages. And it is perhaps understandable that after twenty years one would like here and there to make certain changes in the style of a book. The new edition differs from the first only in certain extensions that have been made, not in alterations of content. I believe that a man who is looking for a scientific basis for Spiritual Science can discover it through Goethe's world-conception. Therefore it seems to me that a work on Goethe's world-conception may also be of service to those who wish to concern themselves with Anthroposophical Spiritual Science. My book, however, is written as a study of Goethe's world-conception per se, without reference to Spiritual Science proper. In my book Goethe's Standard of the Soul: as illustrated in Faust and in the Fairy Story of the Green Snake and the Beautiful Lily 1Anthroposophical Publishing Company, 46 Gloucester Place, London, W.1. Price 2/6. will be found something of what may be said about Goethe from the specially spiritual-scientific point of view.
[ 3 ] Supplementary Note: A critic of this book (Kantstudium III, 1898), thought he was making a special discovery with regard to my “contradictions” by comparing what I say about Platonism (in the first edition, 1897) with what I said practically at the same time in my Introduction to Vol. IV of Goethe's Natural Scientific Works (Kürschner): “Plato's philosophy is one of the most sublime thought-edifices that have ever emanated from the mind of man. It is one of the saddest signs of our age that the Platonic mode of perception is regarded in philosophy as the opposite of sound reason.” Certain minds will find it difficult to understand that when looked at from different angles, every single thing reveals itself differently. The fact that my different utterances about Platonism do not represent real contradictions will be evident to those who do not stop at the mere sound of the words, but who penetrate into the different connections in which Platonism in its essential nature impelled me to bring it at one time or another. It is on the one hand a sad sign when Platonism is held to be contradictory to healthy reason, because it is thought that to remain stationary at pure sense-perception as the only reality alone conforms to this healthy reason. And it is also contradictory to a healthy perception of idea and sense-world when Platonism is applied in such a way that it brings about an unsound separation of idea and sense-perception. Those who cannot bring themselves to penetrate the phenomena of life with thought in this sense will always remain, together with what they apprehend, outside of reality. Those who—speaking in the Goethean sense—set up a concept in order to circumscribe a rich life-content do not understand that life unfolds in relationships that operate differently in different directions. It is naturally more convenient to substitute a schematic concept for a view of life in its entirety; with such concepts one can easily judge schematically. Through such a procedure, however, one lives in lifeless abstractions. Human concepts become abstractions for the very reason that man imagines he can manipulate these concepts in his intellect in the same way as objects manipulate each other. These concepts are, however, more comparable to pictures that man receives from different sides of the same object. The object is one, the pictures many. What leads to a real perception of the object is not concentration upon a single picture but the bringing together of many. Unfortunately I have had to recognise how great the tendency is among many critics to construe “contradictions” from what is really observation of a phenomenon from different points of view—a mode of observation that strives to be permeated with reality. For this reason I felt obliged by a slight alteration of style in this new edition first to make still clearer in my remarks concerning Platonism what I thought was clear enough twenty years ago in the first edition; secondly, to show by direct quotation from my other work in juxtaposition to what is said in this book, the complete harmony that exists between the two utterances. However, if there is anyone who still thinks he can discover contradictions in these matters I have thereby spared him the trouble of having to collect them from two books.
Nachwort zur Neuauflage 1918
[ 1 ] Von Beurteilern dieser Schrift wurde gleich nach ihrem Erscheinen gesagt, daß sie nicht ein Bild von Goethes «Weltanschauung», sondern nur von seiner «Naturanschauung» gebe. Ich bin nicht der Ansicht, daß dieses Urteil von einem berechtigten Gesichtspunkte aus gefällt ist, wenn auch, äußerlich betrachtet, in dem Buche fast ausschließlich von Goethes Naturideen die Rede ist. Denn ich glaube im Verlaufe meiner Ausführungen gezeigt zu haben, daß diese Naturideen auf einer ganz bestimmten Art, die Welterscheinungen anzusehen, beruhen. Und ich meine, durch die Schrift selbst, angedeutet zu haben, daß das Einnehmen eines Gesichtspunktes gegenüber den Naturerscheinungen, wie ihn Goethe gehabt hat, zu bestimmten Ansichten, über psychologische, historische und weitergehende Weltenerscheinungen führen kann. Was sich in Goethes Naturanschauung auf einem bestimmten Gebiete aus spricht, ist eben eine Weltanschauung, nicht eine bloße Naturanschauung, die auch eine Persönlichkeit haben könnte, deren Gedanken für ein weiteres Weltbild keine Bedeutung haben. Andrerseits aber glaubte ich in diesem Buche nichts anderes darstellen zu sollen, als was sich in unmittelbarem Anschlusse an das Gebiet sagen läßt, das Goethe selbst aus dem Gesamtumfange seiner Weltanschauung herausgearbeitet hat. Das Weltbild zu zeichnen, das sich in Goethes Dichtungen, in seinen kunstgeschichtlichen Ideen usw. offenbart, ist selbstverständlich durchaus möglich und zweifellos von dem allerhöchsten Interesse. Wer die Haltung der vorliegenden Schrift ins Auge faßt, wird in derselben ein solches Weltbild aber nicht suchen. Ein solcher wird erkennen, daß ich mir zur Aufgabe gemacht habe, denjenigen Teil des Goetheschen Weltbildes nachzuzeichnen, für den in seinen eigenen Schriften Ausführungen vorhanden sind, deren eine aus der anderen lückenlos hervorgeht. Ich habe ja auch an den verschiedensten Stellen angedeutet, wo die Punkte liegen, an denen Goethe steckengeblieben ist in dieser lückenlosen Herausarbeitung seines Weltbildes, die ihm für gewisse Naturgebiete gelungen ist. Goethes Ansichten über die Welt und das Leben offenbaren sich in weitestem Umfange. Das Hervorgehen dieser Ansichten aus seiner ihm ureigenen Weltanschauung ist aber aus seinen Werken über das Gebiet der Naturerscheinungen hinaus nicht in der gleichen Art anschaulich wie auf diesem Gebiete. Auf anderen Gebieten wird anschaulich, was Goethes Seele der Welt zu offenbaren hatte; auf dem Gebiete seiner Naturideen wird ersichtlich, wie der Grundzug seines Geistes eine Weltanschauung bis zu einer gewissen Grenze Schritt für Schritt sich erobert. Gerade dadurch, daß man in der Zeichnung von Goethes Gedankenarbeit einmal nicht weiter geht als in der Ausführung desjenigen liegt, was sich in ihm selbst zu einem gedanklich geschlossenen Stück Weltanschauung herausgebildet hat, wird man ein Licht gewinnen für die besondere Färbung dessen, was sich sonst in seinem Lebenswerk offenbart. Deshalb wollte ich nicht das Weltbild malen, das aus Goethes Lebenswerk im Ganzen spricht, sondern denjenigen Teil, der bei ihm selbst in der Form zu Tage tritt, in der man eine Weltanschauung gedanklich zum Ausdrucke bringt. Aus einer noch so großen Persönlichkeit hervorquellende Anschauungen sind noch nicht Teile eines in sich geschlossenen und von der Persönlichkeit selbst zusammenhängend gedachten Weltanschauungsbildes. Aber Goethes Naturideen sind ein solches in sich geschlossenes Stück eines Weltanschauungsbildes. Und sie sind als Beleuchtung von Naturerscheinungen nicht eine bloße Naturansicht, sondern das Glied einer Weltanschauung.
[ 2 ] Daß man mir auch angesichts dieses Buches vorgeworfen hat, meine Anschauungen haben sich seit dem Erscheinen desselben geändert, wundert mich nicht, da ich nicht unbekannt bin mit den Voraussetzungen, von denen man sich bei solchen Urteilen leiten läßt. Ich habe mich in der Vorrede zum ersten Bande meiner «Rätsel der Philosophie» und in einem Aufsatze in der Zeitschrift «Das Reich»(«Die Geisteswissenschaft als Anthroposophie und die zeitgenössische Erkenntnistheorie», 2. Jahrgang, 2. Buch des «Reiches») über dieses Suchen nach Widersprüchen in meinen Schriften ausgesprochen. Ein solches Suchen ist nur bei Beurteilern möglich, die völlig verkennen, wie gerade meine Weltanschauung sich verhalten muß, wenn sie verschiedene Gebiete des Lebens ins Auge fassen will. Ich will hier nicht im allgemeinen auf diese Frage noch einmal eingehen, sondern nur kurz einiges mit Bezug auf dieses Goethebuch bemerken. Ich selber sehe in der anthroposophisch orientierten Geisteswissenschaft, die ich in meinen Schriften seit 16 Jahren zur Darstellung bringe, diejenige Erkenntnisart für den dem Menschen zugänglichen geistigen Weltgehalt, zu welcher derjenige kommen muß, der die Goetheschen Naturideen als etwas ihm Gemäßes in seiner Seele belebt hat und von da ausgehend zu Erkennmiserlebnissen über das Geistgebiet der Welt strebt. Ich bin der Ansicht, daß diese Geisteswissenschaft eine Naturwissenschaft voraussetzt, die der Goetheschen entspricht. Nicht so nur meine ich das, daß die von mir zur Darstellung gebrachte Geisteswissenschaft dieser Naturwissenschaft nicht widerspricht. Denn ich weiß, daß es wenig besagen will, wenn zwischen verschiedenen Behauptungen nur kein logischer Widerspruch ist. Sie könnten deshalb doch in der Wirklichkeit durchaus unverträglich sein. Sondern ich glaube einzusehen, daß Goethes Ideen über das Naturgebiet, wirklich erlebt, zu den von mir dargelegten anthroposophischen Erkenntnissen notwendig führen müssen, wenn man, was Goethe noch nicht getan hat, die Erlebnisse im Naturgebiet überleitet zu Erlebnissen im Geistgebiet. Wie diese letzteren Erlebnisse geartet sind, das findet man in meinen geisteswissenschaftlichen Werken beschrieben. Aus diesem Grunde findet man den wesentlichen Inhalt des vorliegenden Buches, das ich 1897 zum ersten Male veröffentlicht habe, als meine Wiedergabe der Goetheschen Weltanschauung auch jetzt, nach der Veröffentlichung meiner geisteswissenschaftlichen Schriften, wieder abgedruckt. Alle darin dargestellten Gedanken gelten mir unverändert auch heute. Ich habe nur an einzelnen Stellen Änderungen angebracht, die sich nicht auf die Haltung der Gedanken, sondern nur auf Stilisierung einzelner Ausführungen erstrecken. Und daß man, nach zwanzig Jahren, bei einem Buche da oder dort einiges anders zu stilisieren wünscht, kann am Ende begreiflich erscheinen. Was sonst in der Neuauflage anders ist als in der vorigen sind einige Erweiterungen, nicht Änderungen des Inhalts. Ich bin der Meinung, daß wer einen naturwissenschaftlichen Unterbau für die Geisteswissenschaft sucht, ihn durch Goethes Weltanschauung finden kann. Deshalb scheint mir, daß eine Schrift über Goethes Weltanschauung auch dem von Bedeutung sein kann, der sich mit der anthroposophisch orientierten Geisteswissenschaft beschäftigen will. Meine Schrift ist aber so gehalten, daß sie Goethes Weltanschauung ganz für sich, ohne Bezug zur eigentlichen Geisteswissenschaft, betrachten will. (Einiges von dem, was von besonderem geisteswissenschaftlichen Gesichtspunkte über Goethe zu sagen ist, wird man in meiner Schrift über «Goethes Faust und das Märchen von der grünen Schlange» finden.)
[ 3 ] Nachträgliche Anmerkung: Ein Kritiker dieses meines Goethebuches (in den Kantstudien III, 1898) hat geglaubt, einen besonderen Fund in bezug auf meine «Widersprüche» zu machen, indem er, was ich in diesem Buche über den Platonismus sage (in der ersten Auflage 1897) zusammenstellt mit einem Ausspruche, dem ich fast ganz zur selben Zeit in meiner Einleitung zum 4. Band von Goethes naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften (Kürschnersche Ausgabe) getan habe: «Die Philosophie Platos ist eines der erhabensten Gedankengebäude, die je aus dem Geiste der Menschheit entsprungen sind. Es gehört zu den traurigsten Zeichen unserer Zeit, daß platonische Anschauungsweise in der Philosophie geradezu für das Gegenteil von gesunder Vernunft gilt.» Es wird gewissen Geistern eben schwer begreiflich, daß ein jeglich Ding von verschiedenen Seiten betrachtet, verschieden sich darstellt. Daß meine verschiedenen Aussprüche über den Platonismus keinen wirklichen Widerspruch darstellen, wird derjenige leicht einsehen, der nicht an die bloßen Wortklänge sich hält, sondern auf die verschiedenen Beziehungen eingeht, in die ich das eine und das andere Mal den Platonismus, durch seine eigene Wesenheit, bringen mußte. Es ist einerseits ein trauriges Zeichen, wenn man den Platonismus als der gesunden Vernunft widerstrebend ansieht, weil man dieser nur gemäß findet das Stehenbleiben bei der bloßen Sinnesanschauung als der einzigen Wirklichkeit. Und es ist auch einer gesunden Anschauung von Idee und Sinneswelt widerstrebend, wenn man den Platonismus so wendet, daß durch ihn eine ungesunde Trennung von Idee und Sinnesanschauung bewirkt wird. Wer auf eine solche Art gedanklicher Durchdringung der Erscheinungen des Lebens nicht eingehen kann, der bleibt, mit dem, was er begreift, immer außerhalb der Wirklichkeit stehen. Wer - um mit Goethe zu reden - einen Begriff hinpfahlt, um einen reichen Lebensinhalt zu begrenzen, der hat keinen Sinn dafür, daß sich das Leben in Beziehungen ausgestaltet, die nach den verschiedenen Richtungen hin verschieden wirken. Es ist allerdings bequemer, an die Stelle einer Ansicht des vollen Lebens einen schematischen Begriff zu setzen; man kann mit solchen Begriffen eben leicht schematisch urteilen. Man lebt aber durch einen solchen Vorgang in wesenlosen Abstraktionen. Die menschlichen Begriffe werden gerade dadurch zu solchen Abstraktionen, daß man meint, man könne sie im Verstande so behandeln, wie die Dinge einander behandeln. Aber diese Begriffe gleichen vielmehr Bildern, die man von verschiedenen Seiten her von einem Dinge aufnimmt. Das Ding ist eines; der Bilder sind viele. Und nicht die Einstellung auf ein Bild, sondern das Zusammenschauen mehrerer Bilder führt zu einer Anschauung des Dinges. Da ich nun leider sehen mußte, wie viel Neigung bei manchen Beurteilern vorhanden ist, aus einer solchen, nach Durchdringung mit der Wirklichkeit strebenden Betrachten einer Erscheinung unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten «Widersprüche» zu konstruieren, so fühlte ich mich veranlaßt, in dieser Neuauflage bei den Ausführungen über den Platonismus erstens durch eine etwas veränderte Stilisierung der in der ersten Auflage gegebenen Darstellung dasjenige noch besonders deutlich zu machen, was mir vor zwanzig Jahren wahrlich klar genug aus dem Zusammenhange, in dem er steht, zu sein schien; zweitens durch unmittelbares Setzen des Ausspruches aus meiner andern Schrift neben das, was in diesem Buche gesagt ist, zu zeigen, wie die beiden Aussprüche in vollem Einklang miteinander stehen. Wer nun aber doch den Geschmack hat, in solchen Dingen Widersprüche zu finden, dem habe ich dadurch die Mühe erspart, sie erst aus zwei Büchern zusammensuchen zu müssen.
Afterword to the new edition of 1918
[ 1 ] It was said by critics of this work immediately after its publication that it did not give a picture of Goethe's "Weltanschauung", but only of his "Naturanschauung". I am not of the opinion that this judgment was made from a justified point of view, even if, on the face of it, the book speaks almost exclusively of Goethe's ideas of nature. For I believe I have shown in the course of my remarks that these ideas of nature are based on a very particular way of looking at world phenomena. And I believe I have indicated, through the writing itself, that the adoption of a point of view towards natural phenomena, such as Goethe had, can lead to certain views on psychological, historical and further-reaching world phenomena. What is expressed in Goethe's view of nature in a certain area is precisely a world view, not a mere view of nature, which could also be held by a personality whose thoughts have no significance for a further world view. On the other hand, however, I did not believe that I should present in this book anything other than what can be said in direct connection with the area that Goethe himself worked out from the overall scope of his world view. It is, of course, quite possible and undoubtedly of the utmost interest to sketch the world view that reveals itself in Goethe's poetry, in his art-historical ideas, and so on. However, anyone who considers the attitude of the present work will not look for such a world view in it. Such a person will recognize that I have set myself the task of tracing that part of Goethe's view of the world for which there are explanations in his own writings, one of which emerges from the other without any gaps. I have also indicated at various points where Goethe got stuck in this complete elaboration of his world view, which he succeeded in doing for certain areas of nature. Goethe's views on the world and on life reveal themselves in the broadest sense. However, the emergence of these views from his very own world view is not as clear in his works beyond the field of natural phenomena as it is in this field. In other areas it becomes clear what Goethe's soul had to reveal to the world; in the area of his ideas of nature it becomes clear how the basic trait of his spirit conquers a world view step by step up to a certain limit. Precisely by going no further in the sketch of Goethe's work of thought than in the realization of that which has developed in him into a mentally closed piece of world view, one will gain a light for the special colouring of that which otherwise reveals itself in his life's work. That is why I did not want to paint the world view that speaks from Goethe's life's work as a whole, but rather that part of it that comes to light in him himself in the form in which a world view is mentally expressed. The views that emerge from a personality, however great, are not yet part of a self-contained and coherently conceived world view. But Goethe's ideas of nature are such a self-contained piece of a world view. And as an illumination of natural phenomena, they are not a mere view of nature, but the link of a world view.
[ 2 ] I am not surprised that I have been accused of having changed my views since the publication of this book, since I am not unfamiliar with the assumptions that guide such judgments. In the preface to the first volume of my "Rätsel der Philosophie" and in an essay in the journal "Das Reich" ("Die Geisteswissenschaft als Anthroposophie und die zeitgenössische Erkenntnistheorie", 2nd volume, 2nd book of "Das Reich") I have spoken out about this search for contradictions in my writings. Such a search is only possible with judges who completely misjudge how my world view must behave if it wants to take different areas of life into consideration. I will not go into this question again here in general, but only briefly comment on a few things with reference to this Goethe book. I myself see in the anthroposophically oriented spiritual science, which I have been presenting in my writings for 16 years, that kind of knowledge for the spiritual world content accessible to man to which he must come who has enlivened Goethe's ideas of nature in his soul as something corresponding to him and from there strives for cognitive experiences about the spiritual realm of the world. I am of the opinion that this spiritual science presupposes a natural science that corresponds to Goethe's. Not only do I mean that the spiritual science I present does not contradict this natural science. For I know that it says little if there is only no logical contradiction between different assertions. They could therefore be quite incompatible in reality. Rather, I believe I can see that Goethe's ideas about the realm of nature, really experienced, must necessarily lead to the anthroposophical insights I have outlined if, as Goethe has not yet done, the experiences in the realm of nature are transferred to experiences in the realm of spirit. The nature of these latter experiences is described in my spiritual scientific works. For this reason, the essential content of this book, which I published for the first time in 1897, has been reprinted as my rendition of Goethe's world view even now, after the publication of my writings on spiritual science. All the ideas presented in it are still valid for me today. I have only made changes in individual passages, which do not affect the attitude of the thoughts, but only the stylization of individual statements. And it is understandable that, after twenty years, one might wish to stylize a book differently here or there. What is otherwise different in the new edition from the previous one are a few additions, not changes to the content. I am of the opinion that anyone seeking a scientific foundation for spiritual science can find it in Goethe's world view. Therefore, it seems to me that a writing on Goethe's world view can also be of importance to those who want to deal with anthroposophically oriented spiritual science. My writing, however, is designed to consider Goethe's world view entirely on its own, without reference to spiritual science proper. (Some of what can be said about Goethe from the point of view of the humanities in particular can be found in my essay on "Goethe's Faust and the Fairy Tale of the Green Snake").
[ 3 ] Subsequent note: A critic of this book of mine on Goethe (in Kantstudien III, 1898) thought he had made a special discovery with regard to my "contradictions" by combining what I say about Platonism in this book (in the first edition of 1897) with a statement that I made at almost exactly the same time in my introduction to the 4th volume of Goethe's Natural Sciences. Volume 4 of Goethe's scientific writings (Kürschner's edition): "Plato's philosophy is one of the most sublime constructs of thought that ever arose from the spirit of mankind. It is one of the saddest signs of our time that the Platonic approach to philosophy is regarded as the very opposite of sound reason." It is difficult for certain minds to understand that every thing, viewed from different sides, presents itself differently. That my various statements about Platonism do not represent a real contradiction will be easily understood by those who do not adhere to the mere sounds of words, but who consider the various relations into which I had to bring Platonism, on the one hand and on the other, by its own nature. On the one hand, it is a sad sign if one regards Platonism as contrary to sound reason, because one finds it only in accordance with this reason to stand still with the mere view of the senses as the only reality. And it is also contrary to a healthy view of the idea and the sensory world if Platonism is applied in such a way that an unhealthy separation of idea and sensory view is brought about by it. He who cannot enter into this kind of intellectual penetration of the phenomena of life always remains, with what he comprehends, outside reality. He who - to use Goethe's phrase - piles up a concept in order to limit a rich content of life, has no sense of the fact that life takes shape in relationships that have different effects in different directions. It is, however, more convenient to substitute a schematic concept for a view of the fullness of life; it is easy to make schematic judgments with such concepts. But through such a process one lives in abstractions without essence. Human concepts become such abstractions precisely because one thinks that one can treat them in the mind in the same way as things treat each other. But these concepts are rather like images that one receives from different sides of a thing. The thing is one; the images are many. And it is not the focus on one image, but the combination of several images that leads to a view of the thing. Since I unfortunately had to see how much inclination there is among some judges to construct "contradictions" from such an observation of a phenomenon from different points of view, which strives for penetration with reality, I felt compelled in this new edition to make particularly clear in the explanations on Platonism, firstly, by a somewhat altered stylization of the presentation given in the first edition, that which seemed to me twenty years ago to be truly clear enough from the context in which it stands; secondly, to show how the two statements are in complete harmony with each other by placing the statement from my other work next to what is said in this book. But for those who have a taste for finding contradictions in such things, I have saved them the trouble of having to search for them in two books.