The Science of Knowing
GA 2
IX. Thinking and Consciousness
[ 1 ] Now, however, it seems as though we ourselves are bringing in the subjective element here, which we had wanted so decisively to keep out of our epistemology. Although the rest of the perceptual world does not bear a subjective character—as one could gather from our discussions—thoughts do, in fact, bear such a character, even according to our view.
[ 2 ] This objection is based on a confusion of two things: the stage upon which our thoughts appear, and the element which determines their content, from which they receive their inner lawfulness. We definitely do not produce a thought-content as though, in this production, we were the ones who determined into which connections our thoughts are to enter. We only provide the opportunity for the thought-content to unfold itself in accordance with its own nature. We grasp thought \(a\) and thought \(b\) and give them the opportunity to enter into a lawful connection by bringing them into mutual interaction with each other. It is not our subjective organization that determines this particular connection between \(a\) and \(b\) in precisely one particular way and no other. The human spirit effects the joining of thought masses only in accordance with their content. In thinking we therefore fulfill the principle of experience in its most basic form.
[ 3 ] This refutes the view of Kant, of Schopenhauer, and in a broader sense also of Fichte, which states that the laws we assume for the purpose of explaining the world are only a result of our own spiritual organization and that we lay them into the world only by virtue of our spiritual individuality.
[ 4 ] One could raise yet another objection from the subjectivist standpoint. Even if the lawful connection of thought-masses is not brought about by us in accordance with our organization but rather is dependent upon their content, still, this very content itself might be a purely subjective product, a mere quality of our spirit; thus we would only be uniting elements that we ourselves first created. Then our thought-world would be no less a subjective semblance. It is very easy to meet this objection, however. If it had any basis, we would then be connecting the content of our thinking according to laws whose origins would truly be unknown to us. If these laws do not spring from our subjectivity—and this subjectivity is the view we disputed earlier and can now regard as refuted—then what should provide us with laws by which to interconnect a content we ourselves create?
[ 5 ] Our thought-world is therefore an entity fully founded upon itself; it is a self-contained totality, perfect and complete in itself. Here we see which of the two aspects of the thought-world is the essential one: the objective aspect of its content, and not the subjective aspect of the way it arises.
[ 6 ] This insight into the inner soundness and completeness of thinking appears most clearly in the scientific system of Hegel. No one has credited thinking, to the degree he did, with a power so complete that it could found a world view out of itself. Hegel had an absolute trust in thinking; it is, in fact, the only factor of reality that he trusted in the true sense of the word. But no matter how correct his view is in general, he is still precisely the one who totally discredited thinking through the all too extreme form in which he defended it. The way he presented his view is to blame for the hopeless confusion that has entered our “thinking about thinking.” He wanted to make the significance of thoughts, of ideas, really visible by declaring the necessity in thought to be at the same time the necessity in the factual world. He therefore gave rise to the error that the characterizations made by thinking are not purely ideal ones but rather factual ones. One soon took his view to mean that he sought, in the world of sense-perceptible reality, even thoughts as though they were objects. He never really did make this very clear. It must indeed be recognized that the field of thoughts is human consciousness alone. Then it must be shown that the thought-world forfeits none of its objectivity through this fact. Hegel demonstrated only the objective side of thoughts, but most people see only the subjective side, because this is easier; and it seems to them that he treated something purely ideal as though it were an object, that he made it into something mystical. Even many contemporary scholars cannot be said to be free of this error. They condemn Hegel for a failing he himself did not have, but which, to be sure, one can impute to him because he did not clarify this matter sufficiently.
[ 7 ] We acknowledge that there is a difficulty here for our power of judgment. But we believe that this difficulty can be overcome by energetic thinking. We must picture two things to ourselves: first, that we actively bring the ideal world into manifestation, and at the same time, that what we actively call into existence is founded upon its own laws. Now admittedly, we are used to picturing a phenomenon in such a way that we need only approach it and passively observe it. This is not an absolute requirement, however. No matter how unusual it might be for us to picture that we ourselves actively bring something objective into manifestation—that we do not merely perceive a phenomenon, in other words, but produce it at the same time—it is not inadmissible for us to do so.
[ 8 ] One simply needs to give up the usual opinion that there are as many thought-worlds as there are human individuals. This opinion is in any case nothing more than an old preconception from the past. It is tacitly assumed everywhere, without people realizing that there is another view at least just as possible, and that the reasons must first be weighed as to the validity of one or the other. Instead of this opinion, let us consider the following one: There is absolutely only one single thought-content, and our individual thinking is nothing more than our self, our individual personality, working its way into the thought-center of the world. This is not the place to investigate whether this view is correct or not, but it is possible, and we have accomplished what we wanted; we have shown that what we have presented as the necessary objectivity of thinking can easily be seen not to contradict itself even in another context.
[ 9 ] With regard to objectivity, the work of the thinker can very well be compared with that of the mechanic. Just as the mechanic brings the forces of nature into mutual interplay and thereby effects a purposeful activity and release of power, so the thinker lets the thought-masses enter into lively interaction, and they develop into the thought-systems that comprise our sciences.
[ 10 ] Nothing sheds more light on a view than exposing the errors that stand in its way. Let us call upon this method once again as one that has often been used by us to advantage.
[ 11 ] One usually believes that we join certain concepts into larger complexes, or that we think in general in a certain way, because we feel a certain inner (logical) compulsion to do so. Even Volkelt adheres to this view. But how does this view accord with the transparent clarity with which our entire thought-world is present in our consciousness? We know absolutely nothing in the world more exactly than our thoughts. Now can it really be supposed that a certain connection is established on the basis of an inner compulsion, where everything is so clear? Why do I need the compulsion, if I know the nature of what is to be joined, know it through and through, and can therefore guide myself by it? All our thought-operations are processes that occur on the basis of insight into the entities of thoughts and not according to a compulsion. Any such compulsion contradicts the nature of thinking.
[ 12 ] Nonetheless, it could be the case that it is the nature of thinking to impress its content into its own manifestation at the same time, and that, because of our spirit's organization, we are nevertheless unable to perceive this content directly. But this is not the case. The way thought-content approaches us is our guarantee that here we have before us the essential being of the thing. We are indeed conscious of the fact that we accompany every process in the thought world with our spirit. One can nevertheless think of the form of manifestation only as being determined by the essential being of the thing. How would we be able to reproduce the form of manifestation if we did not know the essential being of the thing? One can very well think that the form of manifestation confronts us as a finished totality and that we then seek its core. But one absolutely cannot believe that one is a co-worker in this production of the phenomenon without effecting this production from within the core.
9. Denken und Bewußtsein
[ 1 ] Nun aber scheint es, als ob wir hier das subjektivistische Element, das wir doch so entschieden von unserer Erkenntnistheorie fernhalten wollten, selbst einführten. Wenn schon nicht die übrige Wahrnehmungswelt - könnte man aus unseren Auseinandersetzungen herauslesen - so trage doch der Gedanke, selbst nach unserer Ansicht, einen subjektiven Charakter.
[ 2 ] Dieser Einwand beruht auf einer Verwechslung des Schauplatzes unserer Gedanken mit jenem Elemente, von dem sie ihre inhaltlichen Bestimmungen, ihre innere Gesetzlichkeit erhalten. Wir produzieren einen Gedankeninhalt durchaus nicht so, daß wir in dieser Produktion bestimmten, welche Verbindungen unsere Gedanken einzugehen haben. Wir geben nur die Gelegenheitsursache her, daß sich der Gedankeninhalt seiner eigenen Natur gemäß entfalten kann. Wir fassen den Gedanken a und den Gedanken b und geben denselben Gelegenheit, in eine gesetzmäßige Verbindung einzugehen, indem wir sie miteinander in Wechselwirkung bringen. Nicht unsere subjektive Organisation ist es, die diesen Zusammenhang von a und b in einer gewissen Weise bestimmt, sondern der Inhalt von a und b selbst ist das allein Bestimmende. Daß sich a zu b gerade in einer bestimmten Weise verhält und nicht anders, darauf haben wir nicht den mindesten Einfluß. Unser Geist vollzieht die Zusammensetzung der Gedankenmassen nur nach Maßgabe ihres Inhaltes. Wir erfüllen also im Denken das Erfahrungsprinzip in seiner schroffsten Form.
[ 3 ] Damit ist die Ansicht Kants und Schopenhauers und im weiteren Sinne auch Fichtes widerlegt, daß die Gesetze, die wir behufs Erklärung der Welt annehmen, nur ein Resultat unserer eigenen geistigen Organisation seien, daß wir sie nur vermöge unserer geistigen Individualität in die Welt hineinlegen.
[ 4 ] Man könnte vom subjektivistischen Standpunkte aus noch etwas einwenden. Wenn schon der gesetzliche Zusammenhang der Gedankenmassen von uns nicht nach Maß gabe unserer Organisation vollzogen wird, sondern von ihrem Inhalt abhängt, so könnte doch eben dieser Inhalt ein rein subjektives Produkt, eine bloße Qualität unseres Geistes sein; so daß wir nur Elemente verbinden würden, die wir erst selbst erzeugten. Dann wäre unsere Gedankenwelt nicht minder ein subjektiver Schein. Diesem Einwande ist aber ganz leicht zu begegnen. Wir würden nämlich, wenn er begründet wäre, den Inhalt unseres Denkens nach Gesetzen verknüpfen, von denen wir wahrhaftig nicht wüßten, wo sie herkommen. Wenn dieselben nicht aus unserer Subjektivität entspringen, was wir vorhin doch in Abrede stellten und jetzt als abgetan betrachten können, was soll uns denn Verknüpfungsgesetze für einen Inhalt liefern, den wir selbst erzeugen?
[ 5 ] Unsere Gedankenwelt ist also eine völlig auf sich selbst gebaute Wesenheit, eine in sich selbst geschlossene, in sich vollkommene und vollendete Ganzheit. Wir sehen hier, welche von den zwei Seiten der Gedankenwelt die wesentliche ist: die objektive ihres Inhaltes und nicht die subjektive ihres Auftretens.
[ 6 ] Am klarsten tritt diese Einsicht in die innere Gediegenheit und Vollkommenheit des Denkens in dem wissenschaftlichen Systeme Hegels auf. Keiner hat in dem Grade, wie er, dem Denken eine so vollkommene Macht zugetraut, daß es aus sich heraus eine Weltanschauung begründen könne. Hegel hat ein absolutes Vertrauen auf das Denken, ja es ist der einzige Wirklichkeitsfaktor, dem er im wahren Sinne des Wortes vertraut. So richtig seine Ansicht im allgemeinen auch ist, so ist es aber gerade er, der das Denken durch die allzuschroffe Form, in der er es verteidigt, um alles Ansehen gebracht hat. Die Art, wie er seine Ansicht vorgebracht hat, ist schuld an der heillosen Verwirrung, die in unser «Denken über das Denken» gekommen ist. Er hat die Bedeutung des Gedankens, der Idee, so recht anschaulich machen wollen dadurch, daß er die Denknotwendigkeit zu gleich als die Notwendigkeit der Tatsachen bezeichnete. Damit hat er den Irrtum hervorgerufen, daß die Bestimmungen des Denkens nicht rein ideelle seien, sondern tatsächliche. Man faßte seine Ansicht bald so auf. als ob er in der Welt der sinnenfälligen Wirklichkeit selbst den Gedanken wie eine Sache gesucht hätte. Er hat das wohl auch nie so ganz klargelegt. Es muß eben festgestellt werden, daß das Feld des Gedankens einzig das menschliche Bewußtsein ist. Dann muß gezeigt werden, daß durch diesen Umstand die Gedankenwelt nichts an Objektivität einbüßt. Hegel kehrte nur die objektive Seite des Gedankens hervor; die Mehrheit aber sieht, weil dies leichter ist, nur die subjektive; und es dünkt ihr, daß jener etwas rein Ideelles wie eine Sache behandelt, mystifiziert habe. Selbst viele Gelehrte der Gegenwart sind von diesem Irrtum nicht freizusprechen. Sie verdammen Hegel wegen eines Mangels, den er nicht an sich hat, den man aber freilich in ihn hineinlegen kann, weil er die betreffende Sache zu wenig klargestellt hat.
[ 7 ] Wir geben zu, daß hier für unser Urteilsvermögen eine Schwierigkeit vorliegt. Wir glauben aber, daß dieselbe für jedes energische Denken zu überwinden ist. Wir müssen uns zweierlei vorstellen: einmal, daß wir die ideelle Welt tätig zur Erscheinung bringen, und zugleich, daß das, was wir tätig ins Dasein rufen, auf seinen eigenen Gesetzen beruht. Wir sind nun freilich gewohnt, uns eine Erscheinung so vorzustellen, daß wir ihr nur passiv, beobachtend gegenüberzutreten brauchten. Allein das ist kein unbedingtes Erfordernis. So ungewohnt uns die Vorstellung sein mag, daß wir selbst ein Objektives tätig zur Erscheinung bringen, daß wir mit anderen Worten eine Erscheinung nicht bloß wahrnehmen, sondern zugleich produzieren: sie ist keine unstatthafte.
[ 8 ] Man braucht einfach die gewöhnliche Meinung aufzugeben, daß es so viele Gedankenwelten gibt als menschliche Individuen. Diese Meinung ist ohnehin nichts weiter als ein althergebrachtes Vorurteil. Sie wird überall stillschweigend vorausgesetzt, ohne Bewußtsein, daß eine andere zum mindesten ebensogut möglich ist, und daß die Gründe der Gültigkeit der einen oder der andern denn doch erst erwogen werden müssen. Man denke sich an Stelle dieser Meinung einmal die folgende gesetzt: Es gibt überhaupt nur einen einzigen Gedankeninhalt, und unser individuelles Denken sei weiter nichts als ein Hineinarbeiten unseres Selbstes, unserer individuellen Persönlichkeit in das Gedankenzentrum der Welt. Ob diese Ansicht richtig ist oder nicht, das zu untersuchen ist hier nicht der Ort; aber möglich ist sie, und wir haben erreicht, was wir wollten; nämlich gezeigt, daß es immerhin ganz gut angeht, die von uns als notwendig hingestellte Objektivität des Denkens auch anderweitig als widerspruchslos erscheinen zu lassen.
[ 9 ] In Anbetracht der Objektivität läßt sich die Arbeit des Denkers ganz gut mit der des Mechanikers vergleichen. Wie dieser die Kräfte der Natur in ein Wechselspiel bringt und dadurch eine zweckmäßige Tätigkeit und Kraftäußerung herbeiführt, so läßt der Denker die Gedankenmassen in lebendige Wechselwirkung treten, und sie entwickeln sich zu den Gedankensystemen, die unsere Wissenschaften ausmachen.
[ 10 ] Durch nichts wird eine Anschauung besser beleuchtet als durch die Aufdeckung der ihr entgegenstehenden Irrtümer. Wir wollen hier diese von uns schon wiederholt mit Vorteil angewendete Methode wieder anrufen.
[ 11 ] Man glaubt gewöhnlich, wir verbinden gewisse Begriffe deshalb zu größeren Komplexen, oder wir denken überhaupt in einer gewissen Weise deshalb, weil wir einen gewissen inneren (logischen) Zwang verspüren, dies zu tun. Auch Volkelt hat sich dieser Ansicht angeschlossen. Wie stimmt sie aber zu der durchsichtigen Klarheit, mit der unsere ganze Gedankenwelt in unserem Bewußtsein gegenwärtig ist? Wir kennen überhaupt nichts in der Welt genauer als unsere Gedanken. Soll - da nun ein gewisser Zusammenhang auf Grund eines inneren Zwanges hergestellt werden, wo alles so klar ist? Was brauche ich den Zwang, wenn ich die Natur des zu Verbindenden kenne, durch und durch kenne, und mich also nach ihr richten kann. Alle unsere Gedankenoperationen sind Vorgänge, die sich vollziehen auf Grund der Einsicht in die Wesenheiten der Gedanken und nicht nach Maßgabe eines Zwanges. Ein solcher Zwang widerspricht der Natur des Denkens.
[ 12 ] Es könnte immerhin sein, daß es zwar im Wesen des Denkens liege, in seine Erscheinung zugleich seinen Inhalt einzuprägen, daß wir den letzteren aber trotzdem vermöge der Organisation unseres Geistes nicht unmittelbar wahrnehmen können. Das ist aber nicht der Fall. Die Art, wie der Gedankeninhalt an uns herantritt, ist uns eine Bürgschaft dafür, daß wir hier das Wesen der Sache vor uns haben. Wir sind uns ja bewußt, daß wir jeden Vorgang innerhalb der Gedankenwelt mit unserem Geiste begleiten. Man kann sich doch nur denken, daß die Erscheinungsform von dem Wesen der Sache bedingt ist. Wie sollten wir die Erscheinungsform nachschaffen, wenn wir das Wesen der Sache nicht kennten. Man kann sich wohl denken, daß uns die Erscheinungsform als fertiges Ganze gegenübertritt und wir dann den Kern derselben suchen. Man kann aber durchaus nicht der Ansicht sein, daß man zur Hervorbringung der Erscheinung mitwirkt, ohne dieses Hervorbringen von dem Kerne heraus zu bewirken.
9. Thought and consciousness
[ 1 ] But now it seems as if we ourselves are introducing the subjectivist element here, which we so resolutely wanted to keep away from our theory of cognition. If not the rest of the world of perception - one could read from our arguments - then thought, even in our view, has a subjective character.
[ 2 ] This objection is based on a confusion of the scene of our thoughts with the element from which they receive their content-related determinations, their inner lawfulness. We do not produce a thought content in such a way that we determine in this production which connections our thoughts have to enter into. We only provide the opportunity for the thought content to unfold in accordance with its own nature. We grasp the thought a and the thought b and give them the opportunity to enter into a lawful connection by bringing them into interaction with each other. It is not our subjective organization that determines this connection of a and b in a certain way, but the content of a and b itself is the only determining factor. We have not the slightest influence on the fact that a relates to b in a certain way and not otherwise. Our mind only carries out the composition of thought masses according to their content. We therefore fulfill the principle of experience in its harshest form in thinking.
[ 3 ] This refutes the view of Kant and Schopenhauer, and by extension Fichte, that the laws we assume for the purpose of explaining the world are only a result of our own mental organization, that we only insert them into the world by virtue of our mental individuality.
[ 4 ] One could still object from the subjectivist point of view. If the legal connection of thought masses is not carried out by us according to the measure of our organization, but depends on their content, then this very content could be a purely subjective product, a mere quality of our mind; so that we would only connect elements that we ourselves produced in the first place. Then our world of thought would be no less a subjective semblance. But this objection is quite easy to counter. For, if it were well founded, we would connect the contents of our thought according to laws of which we really did not know where they came from. If they do not spring from our subjectivity, which we denied earlier and can now regard as dismissed, then what is to provide us with laws of association for a content that we ourselves generate?
[ 5 ] Our world of thought is therefore an entity built entirely on itself, a self-contained, self-contained, perfect and complete entity. We see here which of the two sides of the world of thought is the essential one: the objective of its content and not the subjective of its appearance.
[ 6 ] This insight into the inner solidity and perfection of thought appears most clearly in Hegel's scientific system. No one has believed thinking to have such a perfect power as he did that it could establish a world view by itself. Hegel has absolute confidence in thinking, indeed it is the only factor of reality that he trusts in the true sense of the word. As correct as his view is in general, however, it is precisely he who has robbed thinking of all prestige through the overly harsh form in which he defends it. The way in which he put forward his view is to blame for the hopeless confusion that has come into our "thinking about thinking". He wanted to make the meaning of thought, of the idea, quite clear by describing the necessity of thought as the necessity of facts. In this way he caused the error that the determinations of thought are not purely ideal, but actual. His view was soon taken as if he had sought thought as a thing in the world of sensible reality itself. He probably never quite made this clear. It must be established that the field of thought is solely human consciousness. Then it must be shown that the world of thought loses nothing of its objectivity through this circumstance. Hegel brought out only the objective side of thought; but the majority, because this is easier, see only the subjective; and it seems to them that he treated something purely ideal as a thing, mystified it. Even many contemporary scholars cannot be absolved from this error. They condemn Hegel for a defect which he does not have in himself, but which can certainly be attributed to him because he has not made the matter in question sufficiently clear.
[ 7 ] We admit that there is a difficulty here for our judgment. But we believe that it can be overcome by any energetic thinking. We must imagine two things: first, that we bring the ideal world actively into existence, and at the same time that what we actively call into existence is based on its own laws. We are, of course, accustomed to imagining an appearance in such a way that we only need to confront it passively, observationally. But this is not an absolute requirement. As unfamiliar as the idea may be to us that we ourselves actively bring an objective to appearance, that we, in other words, not only perceive an appearance, but at the same time produce it: it is not an inadmissible one.
[ 8 ] One need only abandon the common opinion that there are as many worlds of thought as there are human individuals. This opinion is nothing more than an old-fashioned prejudice anyway. It is tacitly assumed everywhere, without realizing that another is at least equally possible, and that the reasons for the validity of one or the other must first be considered. In place of this opinion, consider the following: There is only one single thought content at all, and our individual thinking is nothing more than a working of our self, our individual personality, into the thought center of the world. Whether this view is correct or not is not the place to examine it here; but it is possible, and we have achieved what we wanted, namely to show that it is at least quite possible to make the objectivity of thought, which we regard as necessary, appear to be without contradiction in other respects as well.
[ 9 ] In view of objectivity, the work of the thinker can be compared quite well with that of the mechanic. Just as the latter brings the forces of nature into an interplay and thereby brings about a purposeful activity and expression of force, so the thinker allows the masses of thought to enter into living interaction, and they develop into the systems of thought that make up our sciences.
[ 10 ] Nothing illuminates a view better than the discovery of the errors that oppose it. We would like to return to this method, which we have already used repeatedly with advantage.
[ 11 ] We usually believe that we combine certain concepts into larger complexes, or that we think in a certain way because we feel a certain inner (logical) compulsion to do so. Volkelt has also subscribed to this view. But how does it correspond to the transparent clarity with which our entire world of thought is present in our consciousness? We know nothing in the world more precisely than our thoughts. Should a certain connection be established on the basis of an inner compulsion when everything is so clear? Why do I need the compulsion if I know the nature of what is to be connected, know it through and through, and can therefore orient myself according to it? All our thought operations are processes that take place on the basis of insight into the nature of thought and not according to compulsion. Such a compulsion contradicts the nature of thought.
[ 12 ] It could at least be that it is in the nature of thought to imprint its content into its appearance at the same time, but that we nevertheless cannot perceive the latter directly due to the organization of our mind. But this is not the case. The way in which the content of the thought approaches us is a guarantee that we have the essence of the thing before us. We are aware that we accompany every process within the world of thought with our spirit. One can only imagine that the form of appearance is conditioned by the being of the thing. How could we create the manifestation if we did not know the essence of the thing? One can well imagine that the manifestation confronts us as a finished whole and that we then search for its core. But one cannot be of the opinion that one contributes to the production of the phenomenon without bringing about this production from the nucleus.