Truth and Science
GA 3
IV. The Starting Point of Epistemology
[ 1 ] According to everything we have seen, investigations at the beginning of a theory of knowing (epistemology), everything that already belongs to the arena of knowing must be excluded. Knowing itself is something that comes with the human condition, something arising through daily activity. If a theory of knowing is really to extend to illuminating the entire field of becoming familiar with, of knowing concepts and ideas (Erkennens), then it must take as its starting point something that has remained completely untouched by this activity, from which the latter itself receives its impetus. What to begin with lies outside of knowing cannot be knowing itself. Therefore, we must look for it immediately before the familiarity of knowing (cognition, Erkennens), so that the very next step that the human being takes from this precursor is an activity of knowing. The way in which this absolute first is to be determined must be such that nothing that already comes from knowing, from cognition, flows into it.
[ 2 ] But such a beginning can only be made with the immediately given picture of the world, the world picture that is available to man before he has subjected it in any way to the cognitive process, before he has made even the slightest statement about it, before he has made the slightest mental judgement about it. What passes before us, and what we pass by, which is a disconnected world view, not separated into individual components,61Differentiation of the given, indistinct, world picture into distinct entities is already a mental activity (ein Akt gedanklicher Tätigkeit). in which nothing is separated, nor related to, or determined by anything else, that is what is immediately given. At this stage of existence-awareness (des Daseins), if we may use the expression, no object, no event is more important, more meaningful than any other. The rudimentary animal-organ, devoid of meaning for development and for life itself, has the right, perhaps for a later stage of recognition-illuminated existence-awareness, to be considered the noblest most essential part of the organism.
Before all cognitive activity, nothing presents itself in the world picture as substance, nothing as accident, nothing as cause or effect; the opposites matter-spirit, body-soul, have not yet been created. But we must also keep away any other predicate from the worldview held at this stage. It can be understood neither as reality nor as appearance, neither as subjective nor as objective, neither as accidental nor as necessary. Whether it is a “thing in itself” or a mere idea cannot be decided at this stage. We have already seen that the findings of physics and physiology, which lead to subsuming “the given” under one of the above categories, must not be placed at the forefront of epistemology.
[ 3 ] If a being with fully developed human intelligence were suddenly created from nothing and confronted the world, the first impression that the world would make on its senses and thinking would be something like what we call the immediately given world view. However, the same thing is not present to a person in this form at any moment of his life. There is nowhere in his development a boundary between pure, passive turning towards what is immediately given and the thinking recognition of it. This circumstance could raise concerns about our positing a beginning of epistemology. About this Hartmann says, “We do not ask what is the content of consciousness of the child who is awakening to consciousness, or of the animal standing at the lowest stage of living creatures, because the philosophizing person has no experience of this. He cannot infer or reconstruct the content of consciousness of primitive biologic organisms at any stage from fertilization to death, as such attempts must always be based on personal experience. We must therefore first determine what is the content of consciousness found by the philosophizing person at the beginning of philosophical reflections”.62Hartmann, Grundproblem, S. 1. The objection to this, however, is that the world view that we have at the beginning of philosophical reflection already contains predicates that are only conveyed through cognition. These must not be accepted uncritically, but must be carefully peeled out of the world picture so that it appears completely pure of everything that has been added through the cognitive process. The boundary between what is given and what is known will not coincide with any moment of human development, but must be drawn artificially. But this can happen at any stage of development if we only correctly draw the line between what comes to us without mental determination, before recognition, and what is made from it through determination and recognition.
[ 4 ] Now one can accuse me of having already accumulated a whole series of mental characterizations, so that I may separate that supposedly immediate world view from the one that people have completed through cognitive processing. But the following must be said against this: the thoughts we have brought up should not characterize that world view, should not indicate any properties of it, should not say anything at all about it, but should only guide our consideration, in such a way that it is taken to the boundary where recognition is placed at its beginning. There can therefore be no talk of the truth or error, the accuracy or falsity of those statements, which in our opinion precede the moment in which we stand at the beginning of the theory of knowledge. They only have the task of leading appropriately to this beginning.
No one who is about to deal with epistemological problems is at the same time confronted with what is rightly called the beginning of knowing, for he has already developed knowledge to a certain extent. To remove from this everything that has been gained by cognition, and to establish a pre-cognitive beginning can only be done conceptually. But concepts have no cognitive value at this stage; they have the purely negative task of removing everything from the field of vision that belongs to knowledge and leading it to where knowing begins. These considerations are signposts pointing to the beginning of the act of knowing, but do not yet belong to it. In everything that the epistemologist puts forward before establishing the beginning, there is only expediency or inexpediency, not truth or error. But even in this starting point itself, all error is excluded, because the error can only begin with recognition, with knowing (Erkennen), and cannot therefore lie before it.
[ 5 ] The last sentence cannot be claimed by any epistemologist not proceeding from these considerations. Where the starting point is made by mentally evaluating an object (or subject), an error is possible at the very beginning, namely right at this evaluation. The justification of this depends on the laws on which the act of knowing is based. However, this can only emerge during epistemological investigations. Only if one says that I separate all mental determinations acquired through knowing from my picture of the world and only hold on to everything that comes into the horizon of my observation without my intervention, then all error is excluded. Since I fundamentally abstain from making any statements, I cannot make any mistakes. [ 6 ] Insofar as error comes into consideration epistemologically, it can only lie within the act of cognition. An illusion is not an error, so if the moon appears larger to us at its rising point than at its zenith, we are not dealing with an error, but with a fact well founded in the laws of nature. An error in knowing would only arise if we incorrectly interpreted “bigger” and “smaller” when combining given perceptions in thinking, but this interpretation lies within the act of knowing.
[ 7 ] If one really wants to understand cognition in its entire essence, then one must undoubtedly first grasp it where it begins, where it sits in the world. It is also clear that what lies before this beginning must not be included in the explanation of cognition, but rather must be assumed. Penetrating the essence of our assumptions is the task of scientific work (wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis) in its individual branches, where we do not want to gain special knowledge about this or that, but rather we want to examine knowing itself. Only when we have understood the act of cognition can we come to a judgment about the significance of statements about world-contents that are made with cognition.
[ 8 ] That is why we refrain from making any attribution, any characterization about what is immediately given, so long as we do not know how such an attribution relates to what is determined. Even with the concept of the “immediately given” we say nothing about what lies before cognition. Its only purpose is to point out the same thing, to focus attention on it. The conceptual formation is here, at the beginning of the theory of knowing, only the first connection in which knowing sits in relation to world-content. This designation itself provides for the eventuality that the entire content of the world is only a web of our own "I", and that exclusive subjectivism therefore rightly exists, because there can be no question of this first connection (dieser Tatsache) being “given”. It could only be the result of cognitive consideration. In other words, it could only turn out to be correct through epistemology, but could not serve as a prerequisite for it.
[ 9 ] Everything that can arise within the horizon of our experiences in the broadest sense is now included in this immediately given world content: sensations, perceptions, views, feelings, acts of will, dream and fantasy images, images, concepts, and ideas. [ 10 ] At this level, illusions and hallucinations are also on an equal footing with other parts of the world content. For what relationship these perceptions have to other perceptions can only be learned by cognitive observation. [ 11 ] If a theory of knowing starts from the assumption that everything just mentioned is the content of our consciousness, then the question immediately arises of how we get from mere consciousness to knowledge of being, to being aware of being. Where is the springboard that leads us from the subjective to the trans-subjective? For me, the matter is completely different. For me, consciousness and the "I" idea are initially only parts of the immediately given, and what relationship the former has to the latter is only a result of cognitive awareness. We do not want to determine cognition from consciousness, but vice versa; consciousness and the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity is determined by cognition. Since we initially isolate the given without any predicates, we must ask how we even arrive at a characterization of it. How is it possible to begin the activity of knowing? How can we designate one part of the worldview, for example, as perception, and another part as concept, one as being, the other as appearance, one as cause, another as effect. How can we separate ourselves from the objective, and regard ourselves as "I" compared to the "not-I"?
[ 12 ] We must find the bridge from the “given” worldview to the one we develop through our knowing. The difficulty is that so long as we just passively stare at what is given, we cannot find a fundamental starting point to build on, on which to continue to develop knowledge. We would have to find a place somewhere in the given where we can intervene, where there is something of the same nature (Homogenes) as cognition. If everything were entirely just given, then it would have to be a matter of simply staring out into the external world and a completely equivalent staring into the world of our individuality. We could then at most describe things as external, but never understand them. Our concepts only have a purely external connection to what they refer to, not an internal one. For true knowing, everything depends on us finding an area somewhere in the given where our knowing activity not only presupposes something given, but actively stands in the middle of the given. In other words, it must turn out, especially when we strictly adhere to what is merely given, that not everything is just given. Our prerequisite, through its strict adherence, must partially cancel itself out. We set it up so that we do not arbitrarily fix any beginning of the theory of knowing, but truly seek it out. Everything can be “the given” in this sense, even what is not given in its innermost nature. It then only appears to us formally as a given, but upon closer inspection it reveals itself to be what it really is.
[ 13 ] All the difficulty in understanding knowing lies in the fact that we do not produce the content of the world from within ourselves. If we did that, there would be no recognition at all. A question for me can only arise from a thing if it is “given” to me. Onto whatever I bring forth, I bestow characterizations myself, so I don't need to ask about their authentication. [ 14 ] This is the second point of my epistemology, namely the postulate that there must be something in the realm of the given where our activity does not float in the void, where the content of the world itself is the active agent.
[ 15 ] We determined the beginning of the theory of knowing in such a way that we placed it entirely before cognitive activity, so that no prejudice would cloud knowing itself. In the same way we determine the first step that we take in the development of our discourse, so that there can be no question of error or inaccuracy. For we do not make a judgment about anything, but only point out the requirement that must be fulfilled if knowing is to come about at all. It all depends on us being aware, with full consideration (Besonnenheit, basking in the Sun’s clarity), that we put forward as a postulate the characteristics which that part of the world's content must have on which we can use our cognitive skill.
[ 16 ] Anything else is quite unthinkable. The content of the world as given would be completely undermined. No part can give the impetus of itself to create order in such a chaos. Therefore, cognitive activity must make a power statement and say that certain parts must be such and such. Such a power statement in no way affects the quality of the given. It does not bring arbitrary assertions into the science of clear thinking. It doesn't claim anything at all, but just says that if knowledge is to be clarified at all, then one must search for an arena as described above. If such is present, then there is a clarification of knowing, otherwise not. While we began the theory of knowing with the "given" in general, we now limit the requirement to keeping a specific viewpoint in mind.
[ 17 ] We now should examine this stipulation more closely. Where do we find anything in the world picture that is not just a given, but is a given insofar as it is at the same time something produced, brought forth (Hervorgebrachtes) in the act of knowing?
[ 18 ] We must be completely clear that what is brought forth in the act of knowing must have been given fresh and unmodified. Conclusive inferences are not necessary to recognize this. This already shows that the sensory qualities do not satisfy our requirements, because we do not know directly that these do not arise without our activity, but only through physical and physiological considerations. But we do know directly that concepts and ideas always first enter the sphere of unmodified-given in and by the act of knowing. Therefore no one is mistaken about this characterization of concepts and ideas. One can certainly consider hallucinations to be something given from outside, but one will never believe that its concepts are given to us without our own work of thinking. A madman considers certain things and conditions to be real, and endows them with the label “reality”, even though there are no facts to back that up. A madman will never say, however, of his concepts and ideas, that they enter the world of the “given” without his own activity. Everything else in our worldview has such a character that it must be ‘given’ if we want to experience it, and only with concepts and ideas does the reverse hold true. We must produce Ideas and concepts if we want to experience them.
Only what we call concepts and ideas have been given to us in a form we call “the intellectual view”. Kant and the more recent philosophers who follow him completely deny that people have this ability, because all thinking is supposed to incorporate only objects standing in the vicinity (Gegenstände) and brings forth absolutely nothing out of itself. In the intellectual view, however, the content must be given along with the think-form (Denkform). But isn't this really the case with pure concepts and ideas? — By concept I mean a rule according to which the unconnected elements of perception are combined into a unity. Causality, for example, is a concept. Idea is just a concept with a larger content. Organism, taken completely abstractly, is an idea. — One only must look at concepts and ideas in the form in which they are still completely free of any empirical content. For example, if you want to grasp the pure concept of causality, you must not stick to any specific causality or to the sum of all causalities, but rather to the mere concept of it. We must look for causes and effects in the world (Ursachen und Wirkungen, primal circumstances and how they work themselves out), but we ourselves must produce causality as thought-form before we can find it in the world. But if one wanted to hold on to Kant's assertion that concepts without intuitions are empty, it would be unthinkable to demonstrate the possibility of characterizing the given world through concepts. Suppose two elements of the world's content are given, a and b. If I am to look for a relationship between them, I must do so with a rule that has a certain content, but I can only produce such a rule in the act of cognition itself. I cannot take the rule from the object, because any characterization of the object is done with the help of the rule. Such a rule for the determination of actuality, of being real (Bestimmung des Wirklichen) arises completely within a being capable of pure inner grasping, of pure inner understanding (der rein begrifflichen Entität).
[ 19 ] Before going any further, let's first eliminate a possible objection. It seems as if the idea of the “I”, the “personal subject”, plays a role unconsciously in our thought processes, and that we use this idea in the progress of our thought development without having demonstrated the justification for it. This is the case when we say, for example that we produce concepts, or when we make this or that demand. But nothing in our statements gives reason to see such sentences as more than stylistic twists. As we have already said, the fact that the act of knowing belongs to an “I” and proceeds from it can only be established by cognitive considerations. So, for the time being we should only speak of the act of knowing without even mentioning its bearer. For everything that has been established up to now is limited to the fact that there is something "given" and that the postulate stated above arises from one point of this "given", and finally that concepts and ideas are the in the arena that corresponds to this postulate. This is not to deny that the point from which the postulate arises is the “I”. But for now, we limit ourselves to presenting these two steps of epistemology in their purity.
IV. Die Ausgangspunkte der Erkenntnistheorie
[ 1 ] Am Beginne der erkenntnistheoretischen Untersuchungen ist nach allem, was wir gesehen haben, das abzuweisen, was selbst schon in das Gebiet des Erkennens gehört. Die Erkenntnis ist etwas vom Menschen zustande Gebrachtes, etwas durch seine Tätigkeit Entstandenes. Soll sich die Erkenntnistheorie wirklich aufklärend über das ganze Gebiet des Erkennens erstrecken, dann muß sie etwas zum Ausgangspunkte nehmen, was von dieser Tätigkeit ganz unberührt geblieben ist, wovon die letztere vielmehr selbst erst den Anstoß erhält. Womit anzufangen ist, das liegt außerhalb des Erkennens, das kann selbst noch keine Erkenntnis sein. Aber wir haben es unmittelbar vor dem Erkennen zu suchen, so daß schon der nächste Schritt, den der Mensch von demselben aus unternimmt, erkennende Tätigkeit ist. Die Art nun, wie dieses absolut Erste zu bestimmen ist, muß eine solche sein, daß in dieselbe nichts mit einfließt, was schon von einem Erkennen herrührt.
[ 2 ] Ein solcher Anfang kann aber nur mit dem unmittelbar gegebenen Weltbilde gemacht werden, d. i. jenem Weltbilde, das dem Menschen vorliegt, bevor er es in irgendeiner Weise dem Erkenntnisprozesse unterworfen hat, also bevor er auch nur die allergeringste Aussage über dasselbe gemacht, die allergeringste gedankliche Bestimmung mit demselben vorgenommen hat. Was da an uns vorüberzieht, und woran wir vorüberziehen, dieses zusammenhanglose und doch auch nicht in individuelle Einzelheiten gesonderte 25Das Absondern individueller Einzelheiten aus dem ganz unterschiedlosen gegebenen Weltbild ist schon ein Akt gedanklicher Tätigkeit. Weltbild, in dem nichts voneinander unterschieden, nichts aufeinander bezogen ist, nichts durch ein anderes bestimmt erscheint: das ist das unmittelbar Gegebene. Auf dieser Stufe des Daseins - wenn wir diesen Ausdruck gebrauchen dürfen - ist kein Gegenstand, kein Geschehnis wichtiger, bedeutungsvoller als ein anderer bzw. ein anderes. Das rudimentäre Organ des Tieres, das vielleicht für eine spätere, schon durch das Erkennen erhellte Stufe des Daseins ohne alle Bedeutung für die Entwicklung und das Leben desselben ist, steht gerade mit demselben Anspruch auf Beachtung da, wie der edelste, notwendigste Teil des Organismus. Vor aller erkennenden Tätigkeit stellt sich im Weltbilde nichts als Substanz, nichts als Akzidenz, nichts als Ursache oder Wirkung dar; die Gegensätze von Materie und Geist, von Leib und Seele sind noch nicht geschaffen. Aber auch jedes andere Prädikat müssen wir von dem auf dieser Stufe festgehaltenen Weltbilde fernhalten. Es kann weder als Wirklichkeit noch als Schein, weder als subjektiv noch als objektiv, weder als zufällig noch als notwendig aufgefaßt werden; ob es «Ding an sich» oder bloße Vorstellung ist, darüber ist auf dieser Stufe nicht zu entscheiden. Denn daß die Erkenntnisse der Physik und Physiologie, die zur Subsummierung des Gegebenen unter eine der obigen Kategorien verleiten, nicht an die Spitze der Erkenntnistheorie gestellt werden dürfen, haben wir bereits gesehen.
[ 3 ] Wenn ein Wesen mit vollentwickelter, menschlicher Intelligenz plötzlich aus dem Nichts geschaffen würde und der Welt gegenüberträte, so wäre der erste Eindruck, den letztere auf seine Sinne und sein Denken machte, etwa das, was wir mit dem unmittelbar gegebenen Weltbilde bezeichnen. Dem Menschen liegt dasselbe allerdings in keinem Augenblicke seines Lebens in dieser Gestalt wirklich vor; es ist in seiner Entwicklung nirgends eine Grenze zwischen reinem, passiven Hinauswenden zum unmittelbar Gegebenen und dem denkenden Erkennen desselben vorhanden. Dieser Umstand könnte Bedenken gegen unsere Aufstellung eines Anfangs der Erkenntnistheorie erregen. So sagt z. B. Ed. v. Hartmann: «Wir fragen nicht, welches der Bewußtseinsinhalt des zum Bewußtsein erwachenden Kindes oder des auf der untersten Stufe der Lebewesen stehenden Tieres sei, denn davon hat der philosophierende Mensch keine Erfahrung, und die Schlüsse, durch welche er diesen Bewußtseinsinhalt primitiver biogenetischer oder ontogenetischer Stufen zu rekonstruieren versucht, müssen doch immer wieder auf seiner persönlichen Erfahrung fußen. Wir haben also zunächst festzustellen, was der vom philosophierenden Menschen beim Beginn der philosophischen Reflexion vorgefundene Bewußtseinsinhalt sei.» 26Grundproblem S.1. Dagegen ist aber einzuwenden, daß das Weltbild, das wir am Beginne der philosophischen Reflexion haben, schon Prädikate trägt, die nur durch das Erkennen vermittelt sind. Diese dürfen nicht kritiklos hingenommen, sondern müssen sorgfältig aus dem Weltbilde herausgeschält werden, damit es ganz rein von allem durch den Erkenntnisprozeß Hinzugefügten erscheint. Die Grenze zwischen Gegebenem und Erkanntem wird überhaupt mit keinem Augenblicke der menschlichen Entwicklung zusammenfallen, sondern sie muß künstlich gezogen werden. Dies aber kann auf jeder Entwicklungsstufe geschehen, wenn wir nur den Schnitt zwischen dem, was ohne gedankliche Bestimmung vor dem Erkennen an uns herantritt, und dem, was durch letzteres erst daraus gemacht wird, richtig führen.
[ 4 ] Nun kann man uns vorwerfen, daß wir eine ganze Reihe von gedanklichen Bestimmungen bereits angehäuft haben, um jenes angeblich unmittelbare Weltbild aus dem durch erkennende Bearbeitung von den Menschen vervollständigten herauszuschälen. Aber dagegen ist folgendes zu sagen: was wir an Gedanken aufgebracht haben, sollte ja nicht jenes Weltbild etwa charakterisieren, sollte gar keine Eigenschaft desselben angeben, überhaupt nichts über dasselbe aussagen, sondern nur unsere Betrachtung so lenken, daß sie bis zu jener Grenze geführt wird, wo sich das Erkennen an seinen Anfang gestellt sieht. Von Wahrheit oder Irrtum, Richtigkeit oder Unrichtigkeit jener Ausführungen, die nach unserer Auffassung dem Augenblicke vorangehen, in dem wir am Beginne der Erkenntnistheorie stehen, kann daher nirgends die Rede sein. Dieselben haben nur die Aufgabe, zweckmäßig zu diesem Anfange hinzuleiten. Niemand, der im Begriffe steht, sich mit erkenntnistheoretischen Problemen zu befassen, steht zugleich dem mit Recht so genannten Anfange des Erkennens gegenüber, sondern er hat bereits, bis zu einem gewissen Grade, entwickelte Erkenntnisse. Aus diesen alles zu entfernen, was durch die Arbeit des Erkennens gewonnen ist, und den vor derselben liegenden Anfang festzustellen, kann nur durch begriffliche Erwägungen geschehen. Aber den Begriffen kommt auf dieser Stufe kein Erkenntniswert zu, sie haben die rein negative Aufgabe, alles aus dem Gesichtsfelde zu entfernen, was der Erkenntnis angehört, und dahin zu leiten, wo die letztere erst einsetzt. Diese Erwägungen sind die Wegweiser zu jenem Anfang, an den der Akt des Erkennens herantritt, gehören aber demselben noch nicht an. Bei allem, was der Erkenntnistheoretiker vor der Feststellung des Anfangs vorzubringen hat, gibt es also nur Zweckmäßigkeit oder Unzweckmäßigkeit, nicht Wahrheit oder Irrtum. Aber auch in diesem Anfangspunkte selbst ist aller Irrtum ausgeschlossen, denn der letztere kann erst mit dem Erkennen beginnen, also nicht vor demselben liegen.
[ 5 ] Den letzten Satz darf keine andere als die Erkenntnistheorie für sich in Anspruch nehmen, die von unseren Erwägungen ausgeht. Wo der Ausgangspunkt von einem Objekte (oder Subjekte) mit einer gedanklichen Bestimmung gemacht wird, da ist der Irrtum allerdings auch im Anfange, nämlich gleich bei dieser Bestimmung, möglich. Es hängt ja die Berechtigung derselben von den Gesetzen ab, welche der Erkenntnisakt zugrunde legt. Dieselbe kann sich aber erst im Verlaufe der erkenntnistheoretischen Untersuchungen ergeben. Nur wenn man sagt: ich sondere alle gedanklichen, durch Erkennen erlangten Bestimmungen aus meinem Weltbilde aus und halte nur alles dasjenige fest, was ohne mein Zutun in den Horizont meiner Beobachtung tritt, dann ist aller Irrtum ausgeschlossen. Wo ich mich grundsätzlich aller Aussage enthalte, da kann ich auch keinen Irrtum begehen.
[ 6 ] Insofern der Irrtum erkenntnistheoretisch in Betracht kommt, kann er nur innerhalb des Erkenntnisaktes liegen. Die Sinnestäuschung ist kein Irrtum. Wenn uns der Mond im Aufgangspunkte größer erscheint als im Zenit, so haben wir es nicht mit einem Irrtume, sondern mit einer in den Naturgesetzen wohl begründeten Tatsache zu tun. Ein Fehler in der Erkenntnis entstünde erst, wenn wir bei der Kombination der gegebenen Wahrnehmungen im Denken jenes «größer» und «kleiner» in unrichtiger Weise deuteten. Diese Deutung liegt aber innerhalb des Erkenntnisaktes.
[ 7 ]
Will man wirklich das Erkennen in seiner ganzen Wesenheit begreifen, dann muß man es unzweifelhaft zunächst da erfassen, wo es an seinen Anfang gestellt ist, wo es einsetzt. Auch ist klar, daß dasjenige, was vor diesem Anfang liegt, nicht in die Erklärung des Erkennens mit einbezogen werden darf, sondern eben vorausgesetzt werden muß. In das Wesen dessen einzudringen, was hier von uns vorausgesetzt wird, ist Aufgabe der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis in ihren einzelnen Zweigen. Hier wollen wir aber nicht besondere Erkenntnisse über dieses oder jenes gewinnen, sondern das Erkennen selbst untersuchen. Erst wenn wir den Erkenntnisakt begriffen haben, können wir ein Urteil darüber gewinnen, was die Aussagen über den Weltinhalt für eine Bedeutung haben, die im Erkennen über denselben gemacht werden.
[ 8 ] Deshalb enthalten wir uns solange jeglicher Bestimmung über das unmittelbar Gegebene, solange wir nicht wissen, welchen Bezug eine solche Bestimmung zu dem Bestimmten hat. Selbst mit dem Begriff des «Unmittelbar-Gegebenen» sprechen wir nichts über das vor dem Erkennen Liegende aus. Er hat nur den Zweck, auf dasselbe hinzuweisen, den Blick darauf zu richten. Die begriffliche Form ist hier im Anfange der Erkenntnistheorie nur die erste Beziehung, in welche sich das Erkennen zum Weltinhalte setzt. Es ist mit dieser Bezeichnung selbst für den Fall vorgesorgt, daß der gesamte Weltinhalt nur ein Gespinst unseres eigenen «Ich» ist, daß also der exklusive Subjektivismus zu Recht bestünde; denn von einem Gegebensein dieser Tatsache kann ja nicht die Rede sein. Sie könnte nur das Ergebnis erkennender Erwägung sein, d.h. sich durch die Erkenntnistheorie erst als richtig herausstellen, nicht aber ihr als Voraussetzung dienen.
[ 9 ] In diesem unmittelbar gegebenen Weltinhalt ist nun alles eingeschlossen, was überhaupt innerhalb des Horizontes unserer Erlebnisse im weitesten Sinne auftauchen kann: Empfindungen, Wahrnehmungen, Anschauungen, Gefühle, Willensakte, Traum- und Phantasiegebilde, Vorstellungen, Begriffe und Ideen.
[ 10 ] Auch die Illusionen und Halluzinationen stehen auf dieser Stufe ganz gleichberechtigt da mit anderen Teilen des Weltinhalts. Denn welches Verhältnis dieselben zu anderen Wahrnehmungen haben, das kann erst die erkennende Betrachtung lehren.
[ 11 ] Wenn die Erkenntnistheorie von der Annahme ausgeht, daß alles eben Angeführte unser Bewußtseinsinhalt sei, dann entsteht natürlich sofort die Frage: wie kommen wir aus dem Bewußtsein heraus zur Erkenntnis des Seins, wo ist das Sprungbrett, das uns aus dem Subjektiven ins Transsubjektive führt? Für uns liegt die Sache ganz anders. Für uns sind das Bewußtsein sowohl wie die «Ich»-Vorstellung zunächst nur Teile des Unmittelbar-Gegebenen, und welches Verhältnis die ersteren zu den letzteren haben, ist erst ein Ergebnis der Erkenntnis. Nicht vom Bewußtsein aus wollen wir das Erkennen bestimmen, sondern umgekehrt: vom Erkennen aus das Bewußtsein und das Verhältnis von Subjektivität und Objektivität. Da wir das Gegebene zunächst ohne alle Prädikate lassen, so müssen wir fragen: wie kommen wir überhaupt zu einer Bestimmung desselben, wie ist es möglich, mit dem Erkennen irgendwo anzufangen? Wie können wir den einen Teil des Weltbildes z. B. als Wahrnehmung, den andern als Begriff, den einen als Sein, den andern als Schein, jenen als Ursache, diesen als Wirkung bezeichnen, wie können wir uns selbst von dem Objektiven abscheiden und als «Ich» gegenüber dem «Nicht-Ich» ansehen?
[ 12 ] Wir müssen die Brücke von dem gegebenen Weltbilde zu jenem finden, welches wir durch unser Erkennen entwickeln. Dabei begegnen wir aber der folgenden Schwierigkeit. Solange wir das Gegebene bloß passiv anstarren, können wir nirgends einen Ansatzpunkt finden, an den wir anknüpfen könnten, um von da aus das Erkennen weiterzuspinnen. Wir müßten im Gegebenen irgendwo den Ort finden, wo wir eingreifen können, wo etwas dem Erkennen Homogenes liegt. Wäre alles wirklich nur gegeben, dann müßte es beim bloßen Hinausstarren in die Außenwelt und einem völlig gleichwertigen Hineinstarren in die Welt unserer Individualität sein Bewenden haben. Wir könnten dann die Dinge höchstens als Außenstehende beschreiben, aber niemals sie begreifen. Unsere Begriffe hätten nur einen rein äußerlichen Bezug zu dem, worauf sie sich beziehen, keinen innerlichen. Es hängt für das wahrhafte Erkennen alles davon ab, daß wir irgendwo im Gegebenen ein Gebiet finden, wo unsere erkennende Tätigkeit sich nicht bloß ein Gegebenes voraussetzt, sondern in dem Gegebenen tätig mitten darinnen steht. Mit anderen Worten: Es muß sich gerade bei dem strengen Festhalten an dem Bloß-Gegebenen herausstellen, daß nicht alles ein solches ist. Unsere Forderung muß eine solche gewesen sein, daß sie durch ihre strenge Einhaltung sich teilweise selbst aufhebt. Wir haben sie gestellt, damit wir nicht willkürlich irgend einen Anfang der Erkenntnistheorie festsetzen, sondern denselben wirklich aufsuchen. Gegeben in unserem Sinne kann alles werden, auch das seiner innersten Natur nach Nicht-Gegebene. Es tritt uns eben dann bloß formell als Gegebenes entgegen, entpuppt sich aber bei genauerer Betrachtung von selbst als das, was es wirklich ist.
[ 13 ] Alle Schwierigkeit in dem Begreifen des Erkennens liegt darinnen, daß wir den Weltinhalt nicht aus uns selbst hervorbringen. Würden wir das, so gäbe es überhaupt kein Erkennen. Eine Frage für mich kann durch ein Ding nur entstehen, wenn es mir «gegeben»wird. Was ich hervorbringe, dem erteile ich seine Bestimmungen; ich brauche also nach ihrer Berechtigung nicht erst zu fragen.
[ 14 ] Dies ist der zweite Punkt unserer Erkenntnistheorie. Er besteht in dem Postulat: es muß im Gebiete des Gegebenen etwas liegen, wo unsere Tätigkeit nicht im Leeren schwebt, wo der Inhalt der Welt selbst in diese Tätigkeit eingeht.
[ 15 ] Haben wir den Anfang der Erkenntnistheorie in der Weise bestimmt, daß wir ihn völlig vor die erkennende Tätigkeit legten, um durch kein Vorurteil innerhalb des Erkennens dieses selbst zu trüben, so bestimmen wir jetzt den ersten Schritt, den wir in unserer Entwicklung machen, auch so, daß von Irrtum oder Unrichtigkeit nicht die Rede sein kann. Denn wir fällen kein Urteil über irgend etwas, sondern zeigen nur die Forderung auf, die erfüllt werden muß, wenn überhaupt Erkenntnis zustande kommen soll. Es kommt alles darauf an, daß wir mit vollkommener kritischer Besonnenheit uns des folgenden bewußt sind: wir stellen das Charakteristikum selbst als Postulat auf, welches jener Teil des Weltinhalts haben muß, bei dem wir mit unserer Erkenntnistätigkeit einsetzen können.
[ 16 ] Ein anderes ist aber auch durchaus unmöglich. Der Weltinhalt als gegebener ist ja ganz bestimmungslos. Kein Teil kann durch sich selbst den Anstoß geben, von ihm aus den Anfang zu einer Ordnung in diesem Chaos zu machen. Da muß also die erkennende Tätigkeit einen Machtspruch tun und sagen: so und so muß dieser Teil beschaffen sein. Ein solcher Machtspruch tastet auch das Gegebene in keiner Weise in seiner Qualität an. Er bringt keine willkürliche Behauptung in die Wissenschaft. Er behauptet eben gar nichts, sondern er sagt nur: wenn Erkenntnis als möglich erklärbar sein soll, dann muß nach einem Gebiet gesucht werden, wie es oben bezeichnet worden ist. Ist ein solches vorhanden, dann gibt es eine Erklärung des Erkennens, sonst nicht. Während wir den Anfang der Erkenntnistheorie mit dem «Gegebenen» im allgemeinen machten, schränken wir jetzt die Forderung darauf ein, einen bestimmten Punkt desselben ins Auge zu fassen.
[ 17 ] Wir wollen nun an unsere Forderung näher herantreten. Wo finden wir irgend etwas in dem Weltbilde, das nicht bloß ein Gegebenes, sondern das nur insofern gegeben ist, als es zugleich ein im Erkenntnisakte Hervorgebrachtes ist?
[ 18 ] Wir müssen uns vollständig klar darüber sein, daß wir dieses Hervorbringen in aller Unmittelbarkeit wieder gegeben haben müssen. Es dürfen nicht etwa Schlußfolgerungen nötig sein, um dasselbe zu erkennen. Daraus geht schon hervor, daß die Sinnesqualitäten nicht unserer Forderung genügen. Denn von dem Umstande, daß diese nicht ohne unsere Tätigkeit entstehen, wissen wir nicht unmittelbar, sondern nur durch physikalische und physiologische Erwägungen. Wohl aber wissen wir unmittelbar, daß Begriffe und Ideen immer erst im Erkenntnisakt und durch diesen in die Sphäre des Unmittelbar-Gegebenen eintreten. Daher täuscht sich auch kein Mensch über diesen Charakter der Begriffe und Ideen. Man kann eine Halluzination wohl für ein von außen Gegebenes halten, aber man wird niemals von seinen Begriffen glauben, daß sie ohne eigene Denkarbeit uns gegeben werden. Ein Wahnsinniger hält nur Dinge und Verhältnisse, die mit Prädikaten der «Wirklichkeit» ausgestattet sind, für real, obgleich sie es faktisch nicht sind; nie aber wird er von seinen Begriffen und Ideen sagen, daß sie ohne eigene Tätigkeit in die Welt des Gegebenen eintreten. Alles andere in unserem Weltbilde trägt eben einen solchen Charakter, daß es gegeben werden muß, wenn wir es erleben wollen, nur bei Begriffen und Ideen tritt noch das Umgekehrte ein: wir müssen sie hervorbringen, wenn wir sie erleben wollen. Nur die Begriffe und Ideen sind uns in der Form gegeben, die man die intellektuelle Anschauung genannt hat. Kant und die neueren an ihn anknüpfenden Philosophen sprechen dieses Vermögen dem Menschen vollständig ab, weil alles Denken sich nur auf Gegenstände beziehe und aus sich selbst absolut nichts hervorbringe. In der intellektuellen Anschauung muß mit der Denkform zugleich der Inhalt mitgegeben sein. Ist dies aber nicht bei den reinen Begriffen und Ideen 27Unter Begriff verstehe ich eine Regel, nach welcher die zusammenhanglosen Elemente der Wahrnehmung zu einer Einheit verbunden werden. Kausalität z. B. ist ein Begriff. Idee ist nur ein Begriff mit größerem Inhalt. Organismus, ganz abstrakt genommen, ist eine Idee. wirklich der Fall? Man muß sie nur in der Form betrachten, in der sie von allem empirischen Inhalt noch ganz frei sind. Wenn man z. B. den reinen Begriff der Kausalität erfassen will, darf man sich nicht an irgend eine bestimmte Kausalität oder an die Summe aller Kausalitäten halten, sondern an den bloßen Begriff derselben. Ursachen und Wirkungen müssen wir in der Welt aufsuchen, Ursachlichkeit als Gedankenform müssen wir selbst hervorbringen, ehe wir die ersteren in der Welt finden können. Wenn man aber an der Kantschen Behauptung festhalten wollte, Begriffe ohne Anschauungen seien leer, so wäre es undenkbar, die Möglichkeit einer Bestimmung der gegebenen Welt durch Begriffe darzutun. Denn man nehme an, es seien zwei Elemente des Weltinhaltes gegeben: a und b. Soll ich zwischen denselben ein Verhältnis aufsuchen, so muß ich das an der Hand einer inhaltlich bestimmten Regel tun; diese kann ich aber nur im Erkenntnisakte selbst produzieren, denn aus dem Objekte kann ich sie deshalb nicht nehmen, weil die Bestimmungen dieses letzteren mit Hilfe der Regel eben erst gewonnen werden sollen. Eine solche Regel zur Bestimmung des Wirklichen geht also vollständig innerhalb der rein begrifflichen Entität auf.
[ 19 ] Bevor wir nun weiterschreiten, wollen wir erst einen möglichen Einwand beseitigen. Es scheint nämlich, als ob unbewußt in unserem Gedankengange die Vorstellung des «Ich», des «persönlichen Subjekts» eine Rolle spiele, und daß wir diese Vorstellung in dem Fortschritte unserer Gedankenentwicklung benützen, ohne die Berechtigung dazu dargetan zu haben. Es ist das der Fall, wenn wir z.B. sagen: «wir bringen Begriffe hervor» oder «wir stellen diese oder jene Forderung». Aber nichts in unseren Ausführungen gibt Veranlassung, in solchen Sätzen mehr als stilistische Wendungen zu sehen. Daß der Erkenntnisakt einem «Ich» angehört und von demselben ausgeht, das kann, wie wir schon gesagt haben, nur auf Grund erkennender Erwägungen festgestellt werden. Eigentlich müßten wir vorläufig nur von dem Erkenntnisakt sprechen, ohne einen Träger desselben auch nur zu erwähnen. Denn alles, was bis jetzt feststeht, beschränkt sich darauf, daß ein «Gegebenes» vorliegt, und daß aus einem Punkte dieses «Gegebenen» das oben angeführte Postulat entspringt; endlich, daß Begriffe und Ideen das Gebiet sind, das diesem Postulate entspricht. Daß der Punkt, aus dem das Postulat entspringt, das «Ich» ist, soll damit nicht geleugnet werden. Aber wir beschränken uns fürs erste darauf, jene beiden Schritte der Erkenntnistheorie in ihrer Reinheit hinzustellen.
IV. The starting points of epistemology
[ 1 ] At the beginning of epistemological investigations, after all that we have seen, we must reject that which itself already belongs to the realm of cognition. Cognition is something brought about by man, something that arises through his activity. If the theory of knowledge is really to extend to the entire field of cognition in an enlightening way, then it must take as its starting point something that has remained completely untouched by this activity, something from which the latter itself first receives the impetus. What is to begin with lies outside of cognition, it cannot yet be cognition itself. But we have to seek it immediately before cognition, so that the next step that man takes from it is already cognizing activity. The way in which this absolute first is to be determined must be such that nothing flows into it that already derives from cognition.
[ 2 ] Such a beginning, however, can only be made with the immediately given world-picture, i.e. that world-picture which is present to man before he has subjected it in any way to the process of cognition, i.e. before he has made even the slightest statement about it, the slightest mental determination with it. What passes us by, and what we pass by, this incoherent and yet not separated into individual details, is already an act of mental activity. The separation of individual details from the completely undifferentiated given world picture, in which nothing is differentiated from one another, nothing is related to one another, nothing appears to be determined by another: that is the directly given. At this level of existence - if we may use this expression - no object, no event is more important, more meaningful than another or another. The rudimentary organ of the animal, which is perhaps for a later stage of existence, already illuminated by cognition, without any significance for its development and life, stands there with the same claim to attention as the noblest, most necessary part of the organism. Before all cognitive activity, nothing presents itself in the world picture as substance, nothing as accident, nothing as cause or effect; the opposites of matter and spirit, of body and soul have not yet been created. But we must also keep every other predicate away from the world-picture held at this stage. It can be conceived neither as reality nor as appearance, neither as subjective nor as objective, neither as accidental nor as necessary; whether it is a "thing in itself" or a mere idea cannot be decided at this stage. For we have already seen that the findings of physics and physiology, which tempt us to subsume the given under one of the above categories, must not be placed at the head of epistemology.
[ 3 ] If a being with fully developed human intelligence were suddenly created out of nothing and confronted with the world, the first impression that the latter made on its senses and its thinking would be roughly what we call the immediately given world picture. At no moment in his life, however, does man really have this picture of the world in this form; nowhere in his development is there a boundary between pure, passive turning outwards to the directly given and the thinking recognition of it. This circumstance could raise objections to our positing a beginning of epistemology. For example, Ed. v. Hartmann says: "We do not ask what is the content of the consciousness of the child awakening to consciousness or of the animal standing on the lowest level of living beings, for the philosophizing man has no experience of this, and the conclusions by which he attempts to reconstruct this content of consciousness of primitive biogenetic or ontogenetic levels must always be based on his personal experience. We must therefore first determine what the content of consciousness found by the philosophizing man at the beginning of philosophical reflection is." 26Fundamental Problem p.1. However, it must be objected that the world view that we have at the beginning of philosophical reflection already carries predicates that are only mediated by cognition. These must not be accepted uncritically, but must be carefully peeled out of the world picture so that it appears completely pure of everything added by the process of cognition. The boundary between the given and the known will not coincide at any moment in human development, but must be drawn artificially. But this can happen at every stage of development if we only make the correct cut between what comes to us without mental determination before cognition and what is first made of it by the latter.
[ 4 ] Now we can be accused of having already accumulated a whole series of mental determinations in order to peel that supposedly immediate world picture out of the one completed by human beings through cognitive processing. But against this the following must be said: what we have brought up in thought should not characterize that world-picture, should not indicate any property of it, should not say anything at all about it, but only direct our contemplation in such a way that it is led to that limit where cognition sees itself placed at its beginning. There can therefore be no question of the truth or error, correctness or incorrectness of those explanations which, in our opinion, precede the moment in which we stand at the beginning of the theory of knowledge. They have only the task of leading us to this beginning in an expedient manner. No one who is about to deal with epistemological problems is at the same time confronted with what is rightly called the beginning of cognition, but he already has, to a certain extent, developed knowledge. To remove from these all that has been gained through the work of cognition, and to determine the beginning that lies before it, can only be done through conceptual considerations. But at this stage the concepts have no cognitive value; they have the purely negative task of removing everything from the field of vision that belongs to cognition and guiding it to where the latter first begins. These considerations are the signposts to that beginning which the act of cognition approaches, but they do not yet belong to it. In everything that the epistemologist has to bring forward before the beginning is established, there is therefore only expediency or inexpediency, not truth or error. But even in this point of beginning itself, all error is excluded, for the latter can only begin with cognition, i.e. cannot lie before it.
[ 5 ] No other than the theory of knowledge that proceeds from our considerations may lay claim to the last sentence. Where the starting point is made from an object (or subject) with a mental determination, the error is also possible at the beginning, namely at this determination. Its justification depends on the laws on which the act of cognition is based. But this can only emerge in the course of epistemological investigations. Only if one says: I exclude all mental determinations obtained through cognition from my view of the world and only hold on to everything that enters the horizon of my observation without my intervention, then all error is excluded. Where I abstain from all statements as a matter of principle, I can also commit no error.
[ 6 ] Insofar as the error comes into consideration epistemologically, it can only lie within the act of cognition. The illusion of the senses is not an error. If the moon appears larger to us at the rising point than at the zenith, we are not dealing with an error, but with a fact that is well founded in the laws of nature. An error in cognition would only arise if we interpreted the "larger" and "smaller" in an incorrect way when combining the given perceptions in our thinking. However, this interpretation lies within the act of cognition.
[ 7 ] If one really wants to grasp cognition in its entire essence, then one must undoubtedly grasp it first where it is placed at its beginning, where it begins. It is also clear that what lies before this beginning must not be included in the explanation of cognition, but must be presupposed. To penetrate into the essence of what we are presupposing here is the task of scientific knowledge in its individual branches. Here, however, we do not want to gain special knowledge about this or that, but to investigate cognition itself. Only when we have understood the act of cognition can we reach a judgment about the meaning of the statements about the content of the world that are made about it in cognition.
[ 8 ] This is why we refrain from making any determination about what is immediately given as long as we do not know what relation such a determination has to what is determined. Even with the concept of the "immediately given" we say nothing about what lies before cognition. Its only purpose is to point to it, to direct our gaze towards it. The conceptual form here at the beginning of epistemology is only the first relation in which cognition places itself to the content of the world. With this designation, provision is made even for the case that the entire content of the world is only a fabric of our own "I", i.e. that exclusive subjectivism would rightly exist; for there can be no question of a given existence of this fact. It could only be the result of cognitive consideration, i.e. it could only prove to be correct through epistemology, but not serve as a prerequisite for it.
[ 9 ] This directly given world content now includes everything that can appear within the horizon of our experiences in the broadest sense: Sensations, perceptions, views, feelings, acts of will, dream and fantasy formations, notions, concepts and ideas.
[ 10 ] Illusions and hallucinations also stand at this level on an equal footing with other parts of the content of the world. For only cognitive observation can teach us what relationship they have to other perceptions.
[ 11 ] If epistemology starts from the assumption that everything just mentioned is the content of our consciousness, then of course the question immediately arises: how do we get from consciousness to knowledge of being, where is the stepping stone that leads us from the subjective to the trans-subjective? For us, the matter is quite different. For us, consciousness as well as the "I"-conception are initially only parts of the directly given, and the relationship of the former to the latter is only a result of cognition. It is not from consciousness that we want to determine cognition, but the other way round: from cognition we want to determine consciousness and the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Since we initially leave the given without all predicates, we must ask: how do we arrive at a determination of it at all, how is it possible to start somewhere with cognition? How can we designate one part of the world picture, for example, as perception, the other as concept, the one as being, the other as appearance, the one as cause, the other as effect, how can we separate ourselves from the objective and regard ourselves as "I" as opposed to the "not-I"?
[ 12 ] We must find the bridge from the given world view to the one we develop through our cognition. In doing so, however, we encounter the following difficulty. As long as we merely stare passively at the given, we cannot find a starting point anywhere to which we could connect in order to continue our cognition from there. We would have to find somewhere in the given where we can intervene, where something homogeneous to cognition lies. If everything were really only given, then it would have to end with merely staring out into the outside world and a completely equivalent staring into the world of our individuality. We could then at most describe things as outsiders, but never comprehend them. Our concepts would only have a purely external relationship to what they refer to, not an internal one. For true cognition, everything depends on our finding somewhere in the given an area where our cognizing activity does not merely presuppose a given, but actively stands in the midst of the given. In other words: it must turn out, precisely in the strict adherence to the merely given, that not everything is such. Our demand must have been such that it partially cancels itself out through its strict adherence. We have made it so that we do not arbitrarily fix some beginning of epistemology, but really seek it out. Given in our sense, everything can become given, even that which is not given in its innermost nature. It then appears to us merely formally as a given, but on closer inspection reveals itself to be what it really is.
[ 13 ] All difficulty in the comprehension of cognition lies in the fact that we do not produce the content of the world from ourselves. If we did, there would be no cognition at all. A question can only arise for me through a thing if it is "given" to me. What I produce, I give its determinations to; I therefore do not need to ask about their justification first.
[ 14 ] This is the second point of our epistemology. It consists in the postulate: there must be something in the realm of the given where our activity does not hover in the void, where the content of the world itself enters into this activity.
[ 15 ] If we determined the beginning of epistemology in such a way that we placed it completely before the cognizing activity, so as not to cloud it by any prejudice within cognition itself, we now also determine the first step that we take in our development in such a way that there can be no question of error or incorrectness. For we are not passing judgment on anything, but only pointing out the requirement that must be fulfilled if knowledge is to come about at all. It all depends on our being aware of the following with perfect critical prudence: we set up the characteristic itself as a postulate, which that part of the content of the world must have with which we can begin our cognitive activity.
[ 16 ] However, it is also quite impossible to do otherwise. The content of the world as a given is completely indeterminate. No part of it can by itself give the impulse to make the beginning of an order in this chaos. The cognizing activity must therefore make a power statement and say: this part must be constituted in such and such a way. Such a power-saying does not affect the quality of the given in any way. It does not introduce an arbitrary assertion into science. It does not assert anything at all, but only says: if knowledge is to be explicable as possible, then an area as described above must be sought. If such an area exists, then there is an explanation of cognition, otherwise not. While we began the theory of knowledge with the "given" in general, we now restrict the requirement to focusing on a specific point of it.
[ 17 ] We now want to take a closer look at our claim. Where do we find anything in the world-picture that is not merely a given, but that is only given insofar as it is at the same time something produced in the act of cognition?
[ 18 ] We must be completely clear about the fact that we must have reproduced this emergence in all immediacy. It must not be necessary to draw conclusions in order to recognize it. From this it is already clear that the sense qualities do not satisfy our requirement. For we do not know directly, but only through physical and physiological considerations, that they do not arise without our activity. But we do know directly that concepts and ideas always enter the sphere of the directly given only in the act of cognition and through it. Therefore, no one is mistaken about this character of concepts and ideas. A hallucination may well be regarded as something given from outside, but one will never believe that one's concepts are given to us without one's own mental work. An insane person only considers things and relationships that are endowed with predicates of "reality" to be real, although they are not factually so; but he will never say of his concepts and ideas that they enter the world of the given without his own activity. Everything else in our world-picture has such a character that it must be given if we want to experience it; only in the case of concepts and ideas does the reverse occur: we must produce them if we want to experience them. Only concepts and ideas are given to us in the form that has been called intellectual perception. Kant and the more recent philosophers who follow him completely deny man this capacity, because all thinking relates only to objects and produces absolutely nothing from itself. In intellectual contemplation, the content must be given along with the form of thought. But is this not the case with pure concepts and ideas 27by concept I mean a rule according to which the unconnected elements of perception are combined into a unity. Causality, for example, is a concept. Idea is only a concept with greater content. Organism, taken quite abstractly, is an idea. Really the case? You only have to look at them in the form in which they are still completely free of all empirical content. If, for example, we want to grasp the pure concept of causality, we must not hold to any particular causality or to the sum of all causalities, but to the mere concept of them. We must seek out causes and effects in the world; we must produce causality as a form of thought ourselves before we can find the former in the world. But if one wanted to hold on to Kant's assertion that concepts without views are empty, then it would be inconceivable to demonstrate the possibility of a determination of the given world through concepts. For suppose that two elements of the content of the world are given: a and b. If I am to seek out a relation between them, I must do so by means of a rule determined by their content; but I can only produce this rule in the act of cognition itself, for I cannot take it from the object, because the determinations of the latter are to be obtained with the help of the rule in the first place. Such a rule for determining the real is thus completely absorbed within the purely conceptual entity.
[ 19 ] Before we go any further, let us first remove a possible objection. For it seems as if the idea of the "I", the "personal subject", unconsciously plays a role in our thought process, and that we use this idea in the progress of our thought development without having demonstrated the justification for it. This is the case, for example, when we say: "we bring forth concepts" or "we make this or that claim". But nothing in our explanations gives reason to see more than stylistic turns of phrase in such sentences. That the act of cognition belongs to an "I" and emanates from it can, as we have already said, only be established on the basis of cognitive considerations. Actually, for the time being we should only speak of the act of cognition without even mentioning a bearer of it. For all that has been established so far is limited to the fact that a "given" exists, and that the above-mentioned postulate arises from one point of this "given"; finally, that concepts and ideas are the domain that corresponds to this postulate. That the point from which the postulate arises is the "I" is not to be denied. But for the time being we shall confine ourselves to presenting these two steps of epistemology in their purity.