Truth and Knowledge
GA 3
VII. Epistemological Conclusion
[ 1 ] We have established that the theory of knowledge is a science of significance for all human knowledge. The theory of knowledge alone can explain to us the relationship which the contents of the various branches of knowledge have to the world. Combined with them it enables us to understand the world, to attain a world-view. We acquire positive insight through particular judgments; through the theory of knowledge we learn the value of this insight for reality. Because we have adhered strictly to this absolutely fundamental principle and have not evaluated any particular instances of knowledge in our discussion, we have transcended all one-sided world-views. One-sidedness, as a rule, results from the fact that the enquiry, instead of first investigating the process of cognition itself, immediately approaches some object of this process. Our discussion has shown that in dogmatism, the “thing-in-itself” cannot be employed as its fundamental principle; similarly, in subjective idealism, the “I” cannot be fundamental, for the mutual relationship of these principles must first be defined by thinking. The “thing-in-itself” and “I” cannot be defined by deriving one from the other; both must be defined by thinking in conformity with their character and relationship. The adherent of scepticism must cease to doubt the possibility of knowing the world, for there is no room for doubt in regard to the “given”—it is still untouched by all predicates later bestowed on it by means of cognition. Should the sceptic maintain that our cognitive thinking can never approach the world, he can only maintain this with the help of thinking, and in so doing refutes himself. Whoever attempts to establish doubt in thinking by means of thinking itself admits, by implication, that thinking contains a power strong enough to support a conviction. Lastly, our theory of knowledge transcends both onesided empiricism and onesided rationalism by uniting them at a higher level. In this way, justice is done to both. Empiricism is justified by showing that as far as content is concerned, all knowledge of the given is to be attained only through direct contact with the given. And it will be found that this view also does justice to rationalism in that thinking is declared to be both the necessary and the only mediator of knowledge.
[ 2 ] The world-view which has the closest affinity to the one presented here, built up on epistemological foundations, is that of A. E. Biedermann.1Note by Rudolf Steiner: See his Christliche Dogmatik, Christian Dogmatics, and edition, 1884–85, the epistemological arguments, Vol. 1. A complete discussion of his point of view has been provided by Eduard von Hartmann; see Kritische Wanderungen durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart, Critical Survey of Contemporary Philosophy, p. 200 ff. But to establish his standpoint, Biedermann uses concepts which do not belong in a theory of knowledge at all. He works with concepts such as existence, substance, space, time, etc., without having first investigated the process of cognition alone. Instead of first establishing the fact that in the process of cognition, to begin with, two elements only are present, the given and thinking—he speaks of reality as existing in different forms. For example, he says:
[ 3 ] “Every content of consciousness contains two fundamental factors; two kinds of existence are given to us in it, and these opposites we designate as physical and spiritual, or as bodily and ideal.” (¶ 15) “What exists in space and time is material, but the foundation of all processes of existence, the subject of life, this also exists, but as an ideal; it has ideal being.” (¶ 19)
[ 4 ] Such considerations do not belong in a theory of knowledge, but in metaphysics, which in turn can be established only by means of a theory of knowledge. Admittedly, much of what Biedermann maintains is very similar to what I maintain, but the methods used to arrive at this are utterly different. No reason to draw any direct comparison has thus arisen. Biedermann seeks to attain an epistemological standpoint by means of a few metaphysical axioms. The attempt here is to acquire insight into reality by observing the process of cognition.
[ 5 ] And we believe that we have shown that all conflicts between world-views result from a tendency to attempt to attain knowledge of something objective (thing, I, consciousness, etc.) without having first gained a sufficiently exact knowledge of what alone can elucidate all knowledge: the nature of knowledge itself.
VII. Erkenntnistheoretische Schlussbetrachtung
[ 1 ] Wir haben die Erkenntnistheorie begründet als die Wissenschaft von der Bedeutung alles menschlichen Wissens. Durch sie erst verschaffen wir uns Aufklärung über das Verhältnis des Inhaltes der einzelnen Wissenschaften zur Welt. Sie macht es uns möglich, mit Hilfe der Wissenschaften zur Weltanschauung zu kommen. Positives Wissen erwerben wir durch die einzelnen Erkenntnisse; den Wert des Wissens für die Wirklichkeit erfahren wir durch die Erkenntnistheorie. Dadurch, daß wir streng an diesem Grundsatze festgehalten haben und keinerlei Einzelwissen in unseren Auseinandersetzungen verwertet haben, dadurch haben wir alle einseitigen Weltanschauungen überwunden. Die Einseitigkeit entspringt gewöhnlich daher, daß die Untersuchung, statt sich an den Erkenntnisprozeß selbst zu machen, sogleich an irgendwelche Objekte dieses Prozesses herantritt. Nach unseren Auseinandersetzungen muß der Dogmatismus sein «Ding an sich», der subjektive Idealismus sein «Ich» als Urprinzip fallen lassen, denn diese sind ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältnis nach wesentlich erst im Denken bestimmt. «Ding an sich» und «Ich» sind nicht so zu bestimmen, daß man das eine von dem anderen ableitet, sondern beide müssen vom Denken aus nach ihrem Charakter und Verhältnis bestimmt werden. Der Skeptizismus muß von seinem Zweifel an der Erkennbarkeit der Welt ablassen, denn an dem «Gegebenen» ist nichts zu bezweifeln, weil es von allen durch das Erkennen erteilten Prädikaten noch unberührt ist. Wollte er aber behaupten, daß das denkende Erkennen nie an die Dinge herankommen könne, so könnte er das nur durch denkende Überlegung selbst tun, womit er sich aber auch selbst widerlegt. Denn wer durch Denken den Zweifel begründen will, der gibt implizite zu, daß dem Denken eine für das Stützen einer Überzeugung hinreichende Kraft zukommt. Unsere Erkenntnistheorie, endlich, überwindet den einseitigen Empirismus und den einseitigen Rationalismus, indem sie beide auf einer höheren Stufe vereinigt. Auf diese Weise wird sie beiden gerecht. Dem Empiriker werden wir gerecht, indem wir zeigen, daß alle inhaltlichen Erkenntnisse über das Gegebene nur in unmittelbarer Berührung mit diesem selbst erlangt werden können. Auch der Rationalist findet bei unseren Auseinandersetzungen seine Rechnung, da wir das Denken für den notwendigen und einzigen Vermittler des Erkennens erklären.
[ 2 ] Am nächsten berührt sich unsere Weltanschauung, wie wir sie erkenntnistheoretisch begründet haben, mit der von A. E. Biedermann vertretenen.39Christliche Dogmatik. Die erkenntnistheoretischen Untersuchungen im 1. Band. Eine erschöpfende Auseinandersetzung über diesen Standpunkt hat Eduard von Hartmann geliefert, siehe «Kritische Wanderungen durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart» S.200 ff. Aber Biedermann braucht zur Begründung seines Standpunktes Feststellungen, die durchaus nicht in die Erkenntnistheorie gehören. So operiert er mit den Begriffen: Sein, Substanz, Raum, Zeit usw., ohne vorher den Erkenntnisprozeß für sich untersucht zu haben. Statt festzustellen, daß im Erkenntnisprozeß zunächst nur die beiden Elemente Gegebenes und Denken vorhanden sind, spricht er von Seinsweisen der Wirklichkeit.
[ 3 ] So sagt er z. B. § 15: «In allem Bewußtseinsinhalt sind zwei Grundtatsachen enthalten: 1. es ist uns darin zweierlei Sein gegeben, welchen Seinsgegensatz wir als sinnliches und geistiges, dingliches und ideelles Sein bezeichnen.» Und §19: «Was räumlich-zeitliches Dasein hat, existiert als etwas Materielles; was Grund alles Daseinsprozesses und Subjekt des Lebens ist, das existiert ideell, ist real als ein Ideell-Seiendes.» Solche Erwägungen gehören nicht in die Erkenntnistheorie, sondern in die Metaphysik, die erst mit Hilfe der Erkenntnistheorie begründet werden kann. Zugegeben werden muß, daß Biedermanns Behauptungen den unseren vielfach ähnlich sind; unsere Methode aber berührt sich mit der seinigen durchaus nicht. Daher fanden wir auch nirgends Veranlassung, uns direkt mit ihm auseinanderzusetzen. Biedermann sucht mit Hilfe einiger metaphysischer Axiome einen erkenntnistheoretischen Standpunkt zu gewinnen. Wir suchen durch Betrachtung des Erkenntnisprozesses zu einer Ansicht über die Wirklichkeit zu kommen.
[ 4 ] Und wir glauben in der Tat gezeigt zu haben, daß aller Streit der Weltanschauungen daher kommt, daß man ein Wissen über ein Objektives (Ding, Ich, Bewußtsein usw.) zu erwerben trachtet, ohne vorher dasjenige genau zu kennen, was allein erst über alles andere Wissen Aufschluß geben kann: die Natur des Wissens selbst.
VII Epistemological conclusion
[ 1 ] We have established epistemology as the science of the meaning of all human knowledge. Only through it do we gain insight into the relationship of the content of the individual sciences to the world. It makes it possible for us to arrive at a world view with the help of the sciences. We acquire positive knowledge through the individual insights; we learn the value of knowledge for reality through epistemology. By strictly adhering to this principle and not utilizing any individual knowledge in our arguments, we have overcome all one-sided world views. The one-sidedness usually arises from the fact that, instead of tackling the process of cognition itself, the investigation immediately approaches some object of this process. According to our arguments, dogmatism must drop its "thing-in-itself", subjective idealism its "I" as an original principle, for these are essentially determined in their mutual relationship only in thinking. "Thing in itself" and "I" are not to be determined in such a way that one is derived from the other, but both must be determined from thinking according to their character and relationship. Scepticism must abandon its doubt about the knowability of the world, for there is nothing to doubt about the "given" because it is still untouched by all predicates given by cognition. But if he wanted to claim that thinking cognition could never approach things, he could only do so through thinking reflection itself, which, however, also refutes himself. For whoever wants to justify doubt through thinking implicitly admits that thinking has sufficient power to support a conviction. Finally, our epistemology overcomes one-sided empiricism and one-sided rationalism by uniting both on a higher level. In this way, it does justice to both. We do justice to empiricism by showing that all content-related knowledge about the given can only be obtained in direct contact with the given itself. The rationalist also finds his account in our arguments, since we declare thinking to be the necessary and only mediator of cognition.
[ 2 ] Our worldview, as we have founded it epistemologically, is closest to that of A. E. Biedermann.39Christian Dogmatics. The epistemological studies in volume 1. Eduard von Hartmann has provided an exhaustive discussion of this point of view, see "Kritische Wanderungen durch die Philosophie der Gegenwart" p.200 ff. But Biedermann needs statements to justify his point of view that do not belong in epistemology at all. Thus he operates with the terms: being, substance, space, time, etc., without first having examined the process of cognition for itself. Instead of establishing that in the process of cognition there are initially only the two elements of the given and thinking, he speaks of modes of being of reality.
[ 3 ] For example, he says in § 15: "In all content of consciousness two basic facts are contained: 1. In it we are given two kinds of being, which contradiction of being we call sensual and spiritual, reality and ideality." And §19: "What has spatio-temporal existence exists as something material; what is the ground of all processes of existence and the subject of life exists ideally, is real as an ideal being." Such considerations do not belong in epistemology, but in metaphysics, which can only be justified with the help of epistemology. It must be admitted that Biedermann's assertions are often similar to ours; our method, however, is not at all similar to his. For this reason, we found no reason to deal with him directly. Biedermann seeks to gain an epistemological standpoint with the help of a few metaphysical axioms. We seek to arrive at a view of reality by observing the process of cognition.
[ 4 ] And we believe that we have indeed shown that all disputes between worldviews arise from the fact that one seeks to acquire knowledge about an objective (thing, ego, consciousness, etc.) without first knowing precisely that which alone can provide information about all other knowledge: the nature of knowledge itself.