Truth and Knowledge
GA 3
V. Cognition and Reality
[ 1 ] Concepts and ideas, therefore, comprise part of the given and at the same time lead beyond it. This makes it possible to define what other activity is concerned in attaining knowledge.
[ 2 ] Through a postulate we have separated from the rest of the given world-picture a particular part of it; this was done because it lies in the nature of cognition to start from just this particular part. Thus we separated it out only to enable us to understand the act of cognition. In so doing, it must be clear that we have artificially torn apart the unity of the world-picture. We must realize that what we have separated out from the given has an essential connection with the world content, irrespective of our postulate. This provides the next step in the theory of knowledge: it must consist in restoring that unity which we tore apart in order to make knowledge possible. The act of restoration consists in thinking about the world as given. Our thinking consideration of the world brings about the actual union of the two parts of the world content: the part we survey as given on the horizon of our experience, and the part which has to be produced in the act of cognition before that can be given also. The act of cognition is the synthesis of these two elements. Indeed, in every single act of cognition, one part appears as something produced within that act itself, and, through the act, as added to the merely given. This part, in actual fact, is always so produced, and only appears as something given at the beginning of epistemological theory.
[ 3 ] To permeate the world, as given, with concepts and ideas, is a thinking consideration of things. Therefore, thinking is the act which mediates knowledge. It is only when thinking arranges the world-picture by means of its own activity that knowledge can come about. Thinking itself is an activity which, in the moment of cognition, produces a content of its own. Therefore, insofar as the content that is cognized issues from thinking, it contains no problem for cognition. We have only to observe it; the very nature of what we observe is given us directly. A description of thinking is also at the same time the science of thinking. Logic, too, has always been a description of thought-forms, never a science that proves anything. Proof is only called for when the content of thought is synthesized with some other content of the world. Gideon Spicker is therefore quite right when he says in his book, Lessings Weltanschauung, (Lessing's World-View), page 5, “We can never experience, either empirically or logically, whether thinking in itself is correct.” One could add to this that with thinking, all proof ceases. For proof presupposes thinking. One may be able to prove a particular fact, but one can never prove proof as such. We can only describe what a proof is. In logic, all theory is pure empiricism; in the science of logic there is only observation. But when we want to know something other than thinking, we can do so only with the help of thinking; this means that thinking has to approach something given and transform its chaotic relationship with the world-picture into a systematic one. This means that thinking approaches the given world-content as an organizing principle. The process takes place as follows: Thinking first lifts out certain entities from the totality of the world-whole. In the given nothing is really separate; everything is a connected continuum. Then thinking relates these separate entities to each other in accordance with the thought-forms it produces, and also determines the outcome of this relationship. When thinking restores a relationship between two separate sections of the world-content, it does not do so arbitrarily. Thinking waits for what comes to light of its own accord as the result of restoring the relationship. And it is this result alone which is knowledge of that particular section of the world content. If the latter were unable to express anything about itself through that particular relationship established by thinking, then this attempt made by thinking would fail, and one would have to try again. All knowledge depends on man's establishing a correct relationship between two or more elements of reality, and comprehending the result of this.
[ 4 ] There is no doubt that many of our attempts to grasp things by means of thinking, fail; this is apparent not only in the history of science, but also in ordinary life; it is just that in the simple cases we usually encounter, the right concept replaces the wrong one so quickly that we seldom or never become aware of the latter.
[ 5 ] When Kant speaks of “the synthetic unity of apperception” it is evident that he had some inkling of what we have shown here to be an activity of thinking, the purpose of which is to organize the world-content systematically. But the fact that he believed that the a priori laws of pure science could be derived from the rules according to which this synthesis takes place, shows how little this inkling brought to his consciousness the essential task of thinking. He did not realize that this synthetic activity of thinking is only a preparation for discovering natural laws as such. Suppose, for example, that we detach one content, a, from the world-picture, and likewise another, b. If we are to gain knowledge of the law connecting a and b, then thinking must first relate a to b so that through this relationship the connection between them presents itself as given. Therefore, the actual content of a law of nature is derived from the given, and the task of thinking is merely to provide the opportunity for relating the elements of the world-picture so that the laws connecting them come to light. Thus there is no question of objective laws resulting from the synthetic activity of thinking alone.
[ 6 ] We must now ask what part thinking plays in building up our scientific world-picture, in contrast to the merely given world-picture. Our discussion shows that thinking provides the thought-forms to which the laws that govern the world correspond. In the example given above, let us assume a to be the cause and b the effect. The fact that a and b are causally connected could never become knowledge if thinking were not able to form the concept of causality. Yet in order to recognize, in a given case, that a is the cause and b the effect, it is necessary for a and b to correspond to what we understand by cause and effect. And this is true of all other categories of thinking as well.
[ 7 ] At this point it will be useful to refer briefly to Hume's description of the concept of causality. Hume said that our concepts of cause and effect are due solely to habit. We so often notice that a particular event is followed by another that accordingly we form the habit of thinking of them as causally connected, i.e. we expect the second event to occur whenever we observe the first. But this viewpoint stems from a mistaken representation of the relationship concerned in causality. Suppose that I always meet the same people every day for a number of days when I leave my house; it is true that I shall then gradually come to expect the two events to follow one another, but in this case it would never occur to me to look for a causal connection between the other persons and my own appearance at the same spot. I would look to quite different elements of the world-content in order to explain the facts involved. In fact, we never do determine a causal connection to be such from its sequence in time, but from its own content as part of the world-content which is that of cause and effect.
[ 8 ] The activity of thinking is only a formal one in the upbuilding of our scientific world-picture, and from this it follows that no cognition can have a content which is a priori, in that it is established prior to observation (thinking divorced from the given); rather must the content be acquired wholly through observation. In this sense all our knowledge is empirical. Nor is it possible to see how this could be otherwise. Kant's judgments a priori fundamentally are not cognition, but are only postulates. In the Kantian sense, one can always only say: If a thing is to be the object of any kind of experience, then it must conform to certain laws. Laws in this sense are regulations which the subject prescribes for the objects. Yet one would expect that if we are to attain knowledge of the given then it must be derived, not from the subject, but from the object.
[ 9 ] Thinking says nothing a priori about the given; it produces a posteriori, i.e. the thought-form, on the basis of which the conformity to law of the phenomena becomes apparent.
[ 10 ] Seen in this light, it is obvious that one can say nothing a priori about the degree of certainty of a judgment attained through cognition. For certainty, too, can be derived only from the given. To this it could be objected that observation only shows that some connection between phenomena once occurred, but not that such a connection must occur, and in similar cases always will occur. This assumption is also wrong. When I recognize some particular connection between elements of the world-picture, this connection is provided by these elements themselves; it is not something I think into them, but is an essential part of them, and must necessarily be present whenever the elements themselves are present.
[ 11 ] Only if it is considered that scientific effort is merely a matter of combining facts of experience according to subjective principles which are quite external to the facts themselves,—only such an outlook could believe that a and b may be connected by one law to-day and by another to-morrow (John Stuart Mill).1John Stewart Mill (1806–1873). A stern parent, James Mill taught his son Greek at the age of three, and at seven he studied Plato's dialogues. When he was eight he had to teach his sister Latin. His introduction to the utilitarian teachings of Bentham (the greatest happiness to the greatest number) at the age of fifteen was decisive for his life. His great work, System of Logic, 1843, is the analysis of inductive proof. He was a great champion of human rights, and in the second half of the i9th century his influence throughout Europe was very great. Today it is recognized that—to use Mill's description of Bentham—“He was not a great philosopher but a great reformer in philosophy.” For details on Mill's life and thought, consult any standard encyclopedia. Someone who recognizes that the laws of nature originate in the given and therefore themselves constitute the connection between the phenomena and determine them, will not describe laws discovered by observation as merely of comparative universality. This is not to assert that a natural law which at one stage we assume to be correct must therefore be universally valid as well. When a later event disproves a law, this does not imply that the law had only a limited validity when first discovered, but rather that we failed to ascertain it with complete accuracy. A true law of nature is simply the expression of a connection within the given world-picture, and it exists as little without the facts it governs as the facts exist without the law.
[ 12 ] We have established that the nature of the activity of cognition is to permeate the given world-picture with concepts and ideas by means of thinking. What follows from this fact? If the directly-given were a totality, complete in itself, then such an elaboration of it by means of cognition would be both impossible and unnecessary. We should then simply accept the given as it is, and would be satisfied with it in that form. The act of cognition is possible only because the given contains something hidden; this hidden does not appear as long as we consider only its immediate aspect; the hidden aspect only reveals itself through the order that thinking brings into the given. In other words, what the given appears to be before it has been elaborated by thinking, is not its full totality.
[ 13 ] This becomes clearer when we consider more closely the factors concerned in the act of cognition. The first of these is the given. That it is given is not a feature of the given, but is only an expression for its relation to the second factor in the act of cognition. Thus what the given is as such remains quite undecided by this definition. The second factor is the conceptual content of the given; it is found by thinking, in the act of cognition, to be necessarily connected with the given. Let us now ask: 1) Where is the division between given and concept? 2) And where are they united? The answers to both of these questions are undoubtedly to be found in the preceding discussion. The division occurs solely in the act of cognition. In the given they are united. This shows that the conceptual content must necessarily be a part of the given, and also that the act of cognition consists in re-uniting the two parts of the world-picture, which to begin with are given to cognition separated from each other. Therefore, the given world-picture becomes complete only through that other, indirect kind of given which is brought to it by thinking. The immediate aspect of the world-picture reveals itself as quite incomplete to begin with.
[ 14 ] If, in the world-content, the thought-content were united with the given from the first, no knowledge would exist, and the need to go beyond the given would never arise. If, on the other hand, we were to produce the whole content of the world in and by means of thinking alone, no knowledge would exist either. What we ourselves produce we have no need to know. Knowledge therefore rests upon the fact that the world-content is originally given to us in incomplete form; it possesses another essential aspect, apart from what is directly present. This second aspect of the world-content, which is not originally given, is revealed through thinking. Therefore the content of thinking, which appears to us to be something separate, is not a sum of empty thought-forms, but comprises determinations (categories); however, in relation to the rest of the world-content, these determinations represent the organizing principle. The world-content can be called reality only in the form it attains when the two aspects of it described above have been united through knowledge.
V. Erkennen und Wirklichkeit
[ 1 ] Begriffe und Ideen sind es also, in denen wir das gegeben haben, was zugleich über das Gegebene hinausführt. Damit aber ist die Möglichkeit geboten, auch das Wesen der übrigen Erkenntnistätigkeit zu bestimmen.
[ 2 ] Wir haben durch ein Postulat aus dem gegebenen Weltbilde einen Teil ausgesondert, weil es in der Natur des Erkennens liegt, gerade von diesem so gearteten Teile auszugehen. Diese Aussonderung wurde also nur gemacht, um das Erkennen begreifen zu können. Damit müssen wir uns aber auch zugleich klar darüber sein, daß wir die Einheit des Weltbildes künstlich zerrissen haben. Wir müssen einsehen, daß das von uns aus dem Gegebenen abgetrennte Segment, abgesehen von unserer Forderung und außer derselben, in einer notwendigen Verbindung mit dem Weltinhalte stehe. Damit ist der nächste Schritt der Erkenntnistheorie gegeben. Er wird darinnen bestehen, die Einheit, welche behufs Ermöglichung der Erkenntnis zerrissen worden ist, wieder herzustellen. Diese Wiederherstellung geschieht in dem Denken über die gegebene Welt. In der denkenden Weltbetrachtung vollzieht sich tatsächlich die Vereinigung der zwei Teile des Weltinhalts: dessen, den wir als Gegebenes auf dem Horizonte unserer Erlebnisse überblicken, und dessen, der im Erkenntnisakt produziert werden muß, um auch gegeben zu sein. Der Erkenntnisakt ist die Synthese dieser beiden Elemente. Und zwar erscheint in jedem einzelnen Erkenntnisakte das eine derselben als ein im Akte selbst Produziertes, durch ihn zu dem bloß Gegebenen Hinzugebrachtes. Nur im Anfang der Erkenntnistheorie selbst erscheint das sonst stets Produzierte als ein Gegebenes.
[ 3 ] Die gegebene Welt mit Begriffen und Ideen durchdringen, ist aber denkende Betrachtung der Dinge. Das Denken ist somit tatsächlich der Akt, wodurch die Erkenntnis vermittelt wird. Nur wenn das Denken von sich aus den Inhalt des Weltbildes ordnet, kann Erkenntnis zustande kommen. Das Denken selbst ist ein Tun, das einen eigenen Inhalt im Momente des Erkennens hervorbringt. Soweit also der erkannte Inhalt aus dem Denken allein fließt, bietet er für das Erkennen keine Schwierigkeit. Hier brauchen wir bloß zu beobachten; und wir haben das Wesen unmittelbar gegeben. Die Beschreibung des Denkens ist zugleich die Wissenschaft des Denkens. In der Tat war auch die Logik nie etwas anderes als eine Beschreibung der Denkformen, nie eine beweisende Wissenschaft. Der Beweis tritt erst ein, wenn eine Synthesis des Gedachten mit anderweitigem Weltinhalte stattfindet. Mit Recht sagt daher Gideon Spikcker in seinem Buche: «Lessings Weltanschauung» (S.5): «Daß das Denken an sich richtig sei, können wir nie erfahren, weder empirisch, noch logisch.» Wir können hinzufügen: Beim Denken hört alles Beweisen auf. Denn der Beweis setzt bereits das Denken voraus. Man kann wohl ein einzelnes Faktum, nicht aber das Beweisen selbst beweisen. Wir können nur beschreiben, was ein Beweis ist. In der Logik ist alle Theorie nur Empirie; in dieser Wissenschaft gibt es nur Beobachtung. Wenn wir aber außer unserem Denken etwas erkennen wollen, so können wir das nur mit Hilfe des Denkens, d.h. das Denken muß an ein Gegebenes herantreten und es aus der chaotischen Verbindung in eine systematische mit dem Weltbilde bringen. Das Denken tritt also als formendes Prinzip an den gegebenen Weltinhalt heran. Der Vorgang dabei ist folgender: Es werden zunächst gedanklich gewisse Einzelheiten aus der Gesamtheit des Weltganzen herausgehoben. Denn im Gegebenen ist eigentlich kein Einzelnes, sondern alles in kontinuierlicher Verbindung. Diese gesonderten Einzelheiten bezieht nun das Denken nach Maßgabe der von ihm produzierten Formen aufeinander und bestimmt zuletzt, was sich aus dieser Beziehung ergibt. Dadurch, daß das Denken einen Bezug zwischen zwei abgesonderten Partien des Weltinhaltes herstellt, hat es gar nichts von sich aus über dieselben bestimmt. Es wartet ja ab, was sich infolge der Herstellung des Bezuges von selbst ergibt. Dieses Ergebnis erst ist eine Erkenntnis über die betreffenden Teile des Weltinhaltes. Läge es in der Natur des letzteren, durch jenen Bezug überhaupt nichts über sich zu äußern: nun, dann müßte eben der Denkversuch mißlingen und ein neuer an seine Stelle treten. Alle Erkenntnisse beruhen darauf, daß der Mensch zwei oder mehrere Elemente der Wirklichkeit in die richtige Verbindung bringt und das sich hieraus Ergebende erfaßt.
[ 4 ] Es ist zweifellos, daß wir nicht nur in den Wissenschaften, wo es uns die Geschichte derselben sattsam lehrt, sondern auch im gewöhnlichen Leben viele solche vergebliche Denkversuche machen; nur tritt in den einfachen Fällen, die uns doch zumeist begegnen, der richtige so rasch an die Stelle der falschen, daß uns diese letzteren gar nicht oder nur selten zum Bewußtsein kommen.
[ 5 ] Kant schwebte diese von uns abgeleitete Tätigkeit des Denkens zum Behufe der systematischen Gliederung des Weltinhaltes bei seiner «synthetischen Einheit der Apperzeption» vor. Aber wie wenig sich derselbe die eigentliche Aufgabe des Denkens dabei zum Bewußtsein gebracht hat, geht daraus hervor, daß er glaubt, aus den Regeln, nach denen sich diese Synthesis vollzieht, lassen sich die Gesetze a priori der reinen Naturwissenschaft ableiten. Er hat dabei nicht bedacht, daß die synthetische Tätigkeit des Denkens nur eine solche ist, welche die Gewinnung der eigentlichen Naturgesetze vorbereitet. Denken wir uns, wir lösen irgend einen Inhalt a aus dem Weltbilde los, und ebenso einen andern b. Wenn es zur Erkenntnis eines gesetzmäßigen Zusammenhanges zwischen a und b kommen soll, so hat das Denken zunächst a in ein solches Verhältnis zu b zu bringen, durch das es möglich wird, daß sich uns die bestehende Abhängigkeit als gegebene darstellt. Der eigentliche Inhalt eines Naturgesetzes resultiert also aus dem Gegebenen, und dem Denken kommt es bloß zu, die Gelegenheit herbeizuführen, durch die die Teile des Weltbildes in solche Verhältnisse gebracht werden, daß ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit ersichtlich wird. Aus der bloßen synthetischen Tätigkeit des Denkens folgen also keinerlei objektive Gesetze.
[ 6 ] Wir müssen uns nun fragen, welchen Anteil hat das Denken bei der Herstellung unseres wissenschaftlichen Weltbildes im Gegensatz zum bloß gegebenen Weltbilde? Aus unserer Darstellung folgt, daß es die Form der Gesetzmäßigkeit besorgt. Nehmen wir in unserem obigen Schema an, daß a die Ursache, b die Wirkung sei. Es könnte der kausale Zusammenhang von a und b nie Erkenntnis werden, wenn das Denken nicht in der Lage wäre, den Begriff der Kausalität zu bilden. Aber um im gegebenen Falle a als Ursache, b als Wirkung zu erkennen, dazu ist notwendig, daß jene beiden dem entsprechen, was unter Ursache und Wirkung verstanden wird. Ebenso steht es mit anderen Kategorien des Denkens.
[ 7 ] Es wird zweckmäßig sein, hier auf die Ausführungen Humes über den Begriff der Kausalität mit einigen Worten hinzuweisen. Hume sagt, die Begriffe von Ursache und Wirkung haben ihren Ursprung lediglich in unserer Gewohnheit. Wir beobachten öfters, daß auf ein gewisses Ereignis ein anderes folgt, und gewöhnen uns daran, die beiden in Kausalverbindung zu denken, so daß wir erwarten, daß das zweite eintritt, wenn wir das erste bemerken. Diese Auffassung geht aber von einer ganz irrigen Vorstellung von dem Kausalitätsverhältnis aus. Begegne ich durch eine Reihe von Tagen immer demselben Menschen, wenn ich aus dem Tore meines Wohnhauses trete, so werde ich mich zwar nach und nach gewöhnen, die zeitliche Folge der beiden Ereignisse zu erwarten, aber es wird mir gar nicht einfallen, hier einen Kausalzusammenhang zwischen meinem und des andern Menschen Erscheinen an demselben Orte zu konstatieren. Ich werde noch wesentlich andere Teile des Weltinhaltes aufsuchen, um die unmittelbare Folge der angeführten Tatsachen zu erklären. Wir bestimmen den Kausalzusammenhang eben durchaus nicht nach der zeitlichen Folge, sondern nach der inhaltlichen Bedeutung der als Ursache und Wirkung bezeichneten Teile des Weltinhaltes.
[ 8 ] Daraus, daß das Denken nur eine formale Tätigkeit beim Zustandebringen unseres wissenschaftlichen Weltbildes ausübt, folgt: der Inhalt eines jeden Erkenntnisses kann kein a priori vor der Beobachtung (Auseinandersetzung des Denkens mit dem Gegebenen) feststehender sein, sondern muß restlos aus der letzteren hervorgehen. In diesem Sinne sind alle unsere Erkenntnisse empirisch. Es ist aber auch gar nicht zu begreifen, wie das anders sein sollte. Denn die Kantschen Urteile a priori sind im Grunde gar keine Erkenntnisse, sondern nur Postulate. Man kann im Kantschen Sinne immer nur sagen: wenn ein Ding Objekt einer möglichen Erfahrung werden soll, dann muß es sich diesen Gesetzen fügen. Das sind also Vorschriften, die das Subjekt den Objekten macht. Man sollte aber doch glauben, wenn uns Erkenntnisse von dem Gegebenen zuteil werden sollen, so müssen dieselben nicht aus der Subjektivität, sondern aus der Objektivität fließen.
[ 9 ] Das Denken sagt nichts a priori über das Gegebene aus, aber es stellt jene Formen her, durch deren Zugrundelegung a posterion die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Erscheinungen zum Vorschein kommt.
[ 10 ] Es ist klar, daß diese Ansicht über die Grade der Gewißheit, die ein gewonnenes Erkenntnisurteil hat, a priori nichts ausmachen kann. Denn auch die Gewißheit kann aus nichts anderem denn aus dem Gegebenen selbst gewonnen werden. Es läßt sich dagegen einwenden, daß die Beobachtung nie etwas anderes sage, als daß einmal irgendein Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen stattfindet, nicht aber, daß er stattfinden muß und in gleichem Falle immer stattfinden wird. Aber auch diese Annahme ist eine irrtümliche. Denn wenn ich einen gewissen Zusammenhang zwischen Teilen des Weltbildes erkenne, so ist er in unserem Sinne nichts anderes, als was aus diesen Teilen selbst sich ergibt, es ist nichts, was ich zu diesen Teilen hinzudenke, sondern etwas, was wesentlich zu denselben gehört, was also notwendig dann immer da sein muß, wenn sie selbst da sind.
[ 11 ] Nur eine Ansicht, die davon ausgeht, daß alles wissenschaftliche Treiben nur darinnen bestehe, die Tatsachen der Erfahrung nach außer denselben liegenden, subjektiven Maximen zu verknüpfen, kann glauben, daß a und b heute nach diesem, morgen nach jenem Gesetze verknüpft sein können (J. St. Mill). Wer aber einsieht, daß die Naturgesetze aus dem Gegebenen stammen, somit dasjenige sind, was den Zusammenhang der Erscheinungen ausmacht und bestimmt, dem wird es gar nicht einfallen, von einer bloß komparativen Allgemeinheit der aus der Beobachtung gewonnenen Gesetze zu sprechen. Damit wollen wir natürlich nicht behaupten, daß die von uns einmal als richtig angenommenen Naturgesetze auch unbedingt gültig sein müssen. Aber wenn ein späterer Fall ein aufgestelltes Gesetz umstößt, dann rührt dies nicht davon her, daß dasselbe das erstemal nur mit komparativer Allgemeinheit hat gefolgert werden können, sondern davon, daß es auch dazumal nicht vollkommen richtig gefolgert war. Ein echtes Naturgesetz ist nichts anderes als der Ausdruck eines Zusammenhanges im gegebenen Weltbilde, und es ist ebensowenig ohne die Tatsachen da, die es regelt, wie diese ohne jenes da sind.
[ 12 ] Wir haben es oben als die Natur des Erkenntnisaktes bestimmt, daß das gegebene Weltbild denkend mit Begriffen und Ideen durchsetzt wird. Was folgt aus dieser Tatsache? Wäre in dem Unmittelbar-Gegebenen eine abgeschlossene Ganzheit enthalten, dann wäre eine solche Bearbeitung desselben im Erkennen unmöglich und auch unnötig. Wir würden dann einfach das Gegebene hinnehmen, wie es ist, und wären in dieser Gestalt davon befriedigt. Nur wenn in dem Gegebenen etwas verborgen liegt, was noch nicht erscheint, wenn wir es in seiner Unmittelbarkeit betrachten, sondern erst mit Hilfe der vom Denken hineingebrachten Ordnung, dann ist der Erkenntnisakt möglich. Was in dem Gegebenen vor der gedanklichen Verarbeitung liegt, ist nicht dessen volle Ganzheit.
[ 13 ] Dies wird sogleich noch deutlicher, wenn wir auf die im Erkenntnisakt in Betracht kommenden Faktoren näher eingehen. Der erste derselben ist das Gegebene. Das Gegebensein ist keine Eigenschaft des Gegebenen, sondern nur ein Ausdruck für dessen Verhältnis zu dem zweiten Faktor des Erkenntnisaktes. Was das Gegebene seiner eigenen Natur nach ist, bleibt also durch diese Bestimmung völlig im Dunkeln. Den zweiten Faktor, den begrifflichen Inhalt des Gegebenen, findet das Denken im Erkenntnisakte als notwendig mit dem Gegebenen verbunden. Wir fragen uns nun: 1. Wo besteht die Trennung von Gegebenem und Begriff? 2. Wo liegt die Vereinigung derselben? Die Beantwortung dieser beiden Fragen ist ohne Zweifel in unseren vorangehenden Untersuchungen gegeben. Die Trennung besteht lediglich im Erkenntnisakte, die Verbindung liegt im Gegebenen. Daraus geht mit Notwendigkeit hervor, daß der begriffliche Inhalt nur ein Teil des Gegebenen ist, und daß der Erkenntnisakt darin besteht, die für ihn zunächst getrennt gegebenen Bestandteile des Weltbildes miteinander zu vereinigen. Das gegebene Weltbild wird somit erst vollständig durch jene mittelbare Art Gegebenseins, die durch das Denken herbeigeführt wird. Durch die Form der Unmittelbarkeit zeigt sich das Weltbild zuerst in einer ganz unvollständigen Gestalt.
[ 14 ] Wäre in dem Weltinhalte von vornherein der Gedankeninhalt mit dem Gegebenen vereinigt; dann gäbe es kein Erkennen. Denn es könnte nirgends das Bedürfnis entstehen, über das Gegebene hinauszugehen. Würden wir aber mit dem Denken und in demselben allen Inhalt der Welt erzeugen, dann gäbe es ebensowenig ein Erkennen. Denn was wir selbst produzieren, brauchen wir nicht zu er kennen. Das Erkennen beruht also darauf, daß uns der Weltinhalt ursprünglich in einer Form gegeben ist, die unvollständig ist, die ihn nicht ganz enthält, sondern die außer dem, was sie unmittelbar darbietet, noch eine zweite wesentliche Seite hat. Diese zweite, ursprünglich nicht gegebene Seite des Weltinhaltes wird durch die Erkenntnis enthüllt. Was uns im Denken abgesondert erscheint, sind also nicht leere Formen, sondern eine Summe von Bestimmungen (Kategorien), die aber für den übrigen Weltinhalt Form sind. Erst die durch die Erkenntnis gewonnene Gestalt des Weitinhaltes, in der beide aufgezeigte Seiten desselben vereinigt sind, kann Wirklichkeit genannt werden.
V. Cognition and reality
[ 1 ] Thus, it is in concepts and ideas that we have given that which at the same time leads beyond the given. This, however, offers the possibility of also determining the nature of the remaining cognitive activity.
[ 2 ] We have separated out a part from the given picture of the world by means of a postulate, because it is in the nature of cognition to proceed precisely from this part. This separation was therefore only made in order to be able to comprehend cognition. At the same time, however, we must realize that we have artificially torn apart the unity of the world view. We must realize that the segment separated by us from the given, apart from our demand and outside of it, is in a necessary connection with the content of the world. This is the next step in the theory of knowledge. It will consist in restoring the unity that has been torn apart in order to make knowledge possible. This restoration takes place in thinking about the given world. In the thinking observation of the world, the unification of the two parts of the world's content actually takes place: that which we survey as given on the horizon of our experiences, and that which must be produced in the act of cognition in order to be given. The act of cognition is the synthesis of these two elements. And indeed, in every single act of cognition one of them appears as something produced in the act itself, added by it to the merely given. Only in the beginning of epistemology itself does that which is otherwise always produced appear as a given.
[ 3 ] Pervading the given world with concepts and ideas, however, is thinking contemplation of things. Thinking is thus actually the act by which knowledge is conveyed. Only when thinking organizes the content of the world view of its own accord can knowledge come about. Thinking itself is an act that produces its own content in the moment of cognition. Insofar as the cognized content flows from thinking alone, it offers no difficulty for cognition. Here we need only observe; and we have given the essence directly. The description of thought is at the same time the science of thought. In fact, logic has never been anything other than a description of the forms of thought, never a proving science. Proof only occurs when a synthesis of thought with other world content takes place. Therefore, Gideon Spikcker rightly says in his book: "Lessings Weltanschauung" (p.5): "That thought is right in itself we can never know, either empirically or logically." We can add: All proof ends with thinking. For proof already presupposes thinking. It is possible to prove a single fact, but not proof itself. We can only describe what a proof is. In logic, all theory is only empiricism; in this science there is only observation. But if we want to recognize something apart from our thinking, we can only do so with the help of thinking, i.e. thinking must approach a given and bring it out of its chaotic connection into a systematic connection with the world picture. Thinking thus approaches the given world content as a forming principle. The process is as follows: first, certain details are mentally singled out from the totality of the world as a whole. For in the given there is actually no single thing, but everything is in continuous connection. Thinking now relates these separate details to each other according to the forms it has produced and finally determines what results from this relationship. By establishing a relation between two separate parts of the content of the world, thinking has not determined anything about them of its own accord. It waits to see what emerges of its own accord as a result of establishing the relation. Only this result is a realization about the relevant parts of the world content. If it were in the nature of the latter to express nothing at all about itself through this reference, then the attempt to think would have to fail and a new one would have to take its place. All knowledge is based on the fact that man brings two or more elements of reality into the right connection and grasps what results from this.
[ 4 ] It is undoubtedly true that we make many such futile attempts at reasoning, not only in the sciences, where the history of the same teaches us so well, but also in ordinary life; only in the simple cases which we mostly encounter, the right one so quickly takes the place of the wrong one that we do not or only rarely become aware of the latter.
[ 5 ] Kant envisioned this activity of thought derived from us for the purpose of systematically structuring the content of the world in his "synthetic unity of apperception". But how little he realized the actual task of thinking in this process is evident from the fact that he believes that the laws of pure natural science can be derived a priori from the rules according to which this synthesis takes place. He did not consider that the synthetic activity of thinking is only one that prepares the extraction of the actual laws of nature. Let us imagine that we detach some content a from the world-picture, and likewise another b. If it is to come to the realization of a lawful connection between a and b, thinking must first bring a into such a relation to b that it becomes possible for the existing dependence to present itself to us as given. The actual content of a law of nature thus results from the given, and it is merely up to thinking to bring about the opportunity by which the parts of the world picture are brought into such relations that their lawfulness becomes apparent. No objective laws follow from the mere synthetic activity of thinking.
[ 6 ] We must now ask ourselves, what part does thinking play in the production of our scientific world view as opposed to the merely given world view? It follows from our description that it is responsible for the form of regularity. Let us assume in our above diagram that a is the cause, b the effect. The causal connection between a and b could never be recognized if thought were not capable of forming the concept of causality. But in order to recognize a as cause and b as effect in the given case, it is necessary that these two correspond to what is understood by cause and effect. It is the same with other categories of thought.
[ 7 ] It will be useful to refer here to Hume's remarks on the concept of causality in a few words. Hume says that the concepts of cause and effect have their origin merely in our habit. We often observe that a certain event is followed by another, and accustom ourselves to think of the two in causal connection, so that we expect the second to occur when we notice the first. But this view is based on a quite erroneous conception of the relation of causality. If, through a series of days, I always meet the same person when I step out of the gate of my house, I will gradually become accustomed to expect the temporal sequence of the two events, but it will not occur to me at all to establish a causal connection between my appearance and that of the other person in the same place. I will look at other parts of the world's content in order to explain the direct consequence of the facts mentioned. We do not determine the causal connection according to the temporal sequence, but according to the meaning of the parts of the world content designated as cause and effect.
[ 8 ] It follows from the fact that thinking only performs a formal activity in the creation of our scientific world view that the content of every cognition cannot be a priori determined before observation (the confrontation of thinking with the given), but must emerge completely from the latter. In this sense, all our cognitions are empirical. But it is also impossible to understand how this could be otherwise. For Kant's a priori judgments are basically not knowledge at all, but only postulates. In Kant's sense, one can only ever say: if a thing is to become the object of a possible experience, then it must obey these laws. So these are rules that the subject makes for the objects. However, one should believe that if we are to gain knowledge of the given, this knowledge must flow not from subjectivity but from objectivity.
[ 9 ] Thinking says nothing a priori about the given, but it produces those forms on the basis of which the lawfulness of phenomena appears a posterion.
[ 10 ] It is clear that this view about the degree of certainty that an acquired judgment of knowledge has, a priori can make no difference. For even certainty cannot be obtained from anything other than the given itself. It can be objected that observation never says anything other than that some connection of phenomena takes place, but not that it must take place and in the same case will always take place. But this assumption is also erroneous. For if I recognize a certain connection between parts of the world picture, it is in our sense nothing other than what results from these parts themselves; it is not something that I think in addition to these parts, but something that belongs essentially to them, which must therefore necessarily always be there if they themselves are there.
[ 11 ] Only a view which assumes that all scientific activity consists only in connecting the facts of experience according to subjective maxims lying outside them, can believe that a and b can be connected today according to this law, tomorrow according to that (J. St. Mill). But he who realizes that the laws of nature derive from the given, and are thus that which constitutes and determines the connection of phenomena, will not even think of speaking of a mere comparative generality of the laws obtained from observation. We do not, of course, mean to assert that the laws of nature once accepted by us as correct must necessarily be valid. But if a later case overturns an established law, this is not due to the fact that the same law could only be deduced with comparative generality the first time, but to the fact that it was not completely correctly deduced at that time either. A genuine law of nature is nothing other than the expression of a connection in the given picture of the world, and it is just as little there without the facts which it governs as these are there without it.
[ 12 ] We have defined it above as the nature of the act of cognition that the given world picture is interspersed with concepts and ideas through thinking. What follows from this fact? If the directly given contained a self-contained wholeness, then such a processing of it in cognition would be impossible and also unnecessary. We would then simply accept the given as it is and would be satisfied with it in this form. Only if there is something hidden in the given that does not yet appear when we look at it in its immediacy, but only with the help of the order brought into it by thinking, is the act of cognition possible. What lies in the given before mental processing is not its full wholeness.
[ 13 ] This will immediately become clearer when we look more closely at the factors that come into consideration in the act of cognition. The first of these is the given. Being given is not a property of the given, but only an expression of its relationship to the second factor of the act of cognition. What the given is by its own nature thus remains completely obscure through this definition. Thinking finds the second factor, the conceptual content of the given, in the act of cognition as necessarily connected with the given. We now ask ourselves: 1. where is the separation of the given and the concept? 2. where is the union of the two? The answer to these two questions is undoubtedly given in our preceding investigations. The separation exists only in the act of cognition, the union lies in the given. From this it necessarily follows that the conceptual content is only a part of the given, and that the act of cognition consists in uniting together the components of the world-picture that are initially given separately for it. The given world-picture thus becomes complete only through that indirect kind of givenness which is brought about by thinking. Through the form of immediacy, the world picture first shows itself in a completely incomplete form.
[ 14 ] If in the content of the world the content of thought were united with the given from the outset, then there would be no cognition. For nowhere could the need arise to go beyond the given. But if we were to produce all the content of the world with and in our thinking, then there would be no cognition either. For we do not need to know what we ourselves produce. Cognition is thus based on the fact that the content of the world is originally given to us in a form that is incomplete, that does not contain it completely, but has a second essential side in addition to what it directly presents. This second, originally not given side of the content of the world is revealed through cognition. What appears separate to us in thinking is therefore not empty forms, but a sum of determinations (categories), which are, however, form for the remaining world content. Only the form of the vast content obtained through cognition, in which both revealed sides of the same are united, can reality be called.